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THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATE LANDS CONSERVATION USING 
 




Conservation easements have been used across the United States to preserve natural 
amenities and compensate landowners for the public goods they provide. From the Farm and 
Ranch Land Protection Program to the Grassland Reserve Program, Colorado conserves 2.4 
million acres of land (Colorado Natural Heritage Program and the Geospatial Centroid, 2018) 
This thesis explores the economic implications of Federal conservation easements through the 
Agricultural Conservation Easement Program in Colorado. Using Input-Output modeling I found 
that conservation easements contributed $176 million to Colorado’s economic activity. Further 
Multi-Region Input-Output models showed that conservation easements support rural counties 
between $106 million and $112 million more than two counterfactuals I considered: decreasing 
federal income tax and a zero counterfactual. Further, using benefit transfer analysis, I estimated 
that all conservation easements in Colorado provide between $40 and $47 billion in ecosystem 
service benefits to Coloradoans. Using econometric meta-analysis techniques, I estimated that 
Coloradoans are willing to pay $4.3 billion for all the conserved lands in Colorado. I propose an 
alternative payment methodology that incentivizes landowners to enroll environmentally 
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 Conservation easements have been used to conserve private lands in federal programs 
since 1985 (Cain & Lovejoy, 2004).  The state of Colorado allocates $45 million annually to 
fund conservation easements (Ray et al., 2016). Landowners permanently retire a subset of their 
private property rights when they enroll in a conservation easement program in exchange for 
payments and/or state and federal tax credits. I hypothesize that the benefits provided by 
conservation easements justify the costs to taxpayers and that an alternative payment mechanism 
could provide more ecological benefits for Colorado. I test this hypothesis by investigating the 
economic consequences of conservation easements in regards to the economic impact, the 
ecological benefits provided, Coloradoans’ willingness to pay for conservation easements, and 
alternative payment mechanisms. 
 Colorado’s awe-inspiring Rocky Mountains attract outdoor enthusiasts from all over the 
world. Since 71 percent of Coloradoans participate in outdoor recreation, it comes as no surprise 
that residents highly value their state’s natural capital: from tourist attractions like jagged 
mountain peaks and sand dunes to an agricultural way of life in the eastern plains and fruit 
orchards on the western slopes (Outdoor Industry Association, 2018). Conservation easement 
programs aim to protect the ecological, cultural, and agricultural value of Colorado’s natural 
capital through purchasing development and building rights from landowners. These easements 
can protect ecologically important habitat, ensure viable farmland for future generations, or 
provide open space and working landscapes. As of 2018, 2.4 million acres of private land have 
been protected through a conservation easement program (Colorado Natural Heritage Program 
and the Geospatial Centroid, 2018). Considering the importance of open space to Coloradoans 
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and the magnitude of Colorado’s conservation programs, gaps still exist in the research literature 
in regards to the economic values and costs.1 We are left asking the question: what are the 
economic consequences of private lands conservation using conservation easements in 
Colorado? 
The goal of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of conservation easements in 
Colorado. To do this, first, I explore the history of conservation easements in the United States 
and in Colorado specifically. I recall the accounts of fraudulent conservation easement claims 
which led to the cautious use of Colorado’s budget for conservation easement programs. Next, I 
investigate the methods for conservation easement payments through the Agricultural 
Conservation Easement Program (ACEP). With the risk of fraudulent claims and additional costs 
to taxpayers, I consider if the economic consequences of conservation easements justify the risk 
and costs. I use a variety of metrics in my analysis. First, I focus on the economic impact of 
conservation easement payments in Colorado. Specifically, I look at the economic impact of 
ACEP funded conservation easement programs in rural Colorado counties. I compare these 
results to two counterfactual scenarios where federal dollars fund other national programs that 
have a negligible impact on Colorado or federal income tax decreases in Colorado. Next, I use 
econometric meta-analysis techniques to produce a Coloradoan willingness to pay for conserved 
lands. Then, I focus on the ecological benefits and costs of conservation easement programs. I 
estimate the value of ecosystem services provided by conservation easements using a benefit 
transfer methodology. I compare these estimates to the costs imposed on taxpayers. Lastly, I 
                                               
1 The following works concern conservation easements in Colorado specifically: Seidl et al., 2017; Wallace et al., 
2008; Seidl, 2004, 2006; Orens et al., 2006; Magnan et al., 2005; Hoag et al., 1998; Ellingson & Seidl, 2009; Coupal 
& Seidl, 2003; Cline & Seidl, 2009, 2010. 
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propose an alternative payment methodology that creates a market for ecosystem services by 
incentivizing landowners to enroll more ecologically important lands.  
 The results of this thesis inform the current discussion in the Colorado House of 
Representatives after passing bill 18-1291 in 2018. This bill mandates an investigation into 
alternative payment mechanisms for conservation easements. Similarly, the U.S. Congress votes 
on the US Farm Bill approximately every five years. This research also informs Colorado’s 
representatives of the benefits of the Farm Bill conservation easement program. Lastly, this 
research shows the need for further investigation of alternative payment mechanisms for 
conservation easements.  
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 Land conservation attempts to preserve certain aspects of land such as open space, 
wildlife, or agriculture while still allowing use of the land (Westover, 2016). Under this broad 
definition, land conservation takes many forms. Public land conservation requires the 
government to own the lands in order to conserve them. In contrast, in private land conservation, 
the government pays to place restrictions on the land without outright purchase. I focus on a 
particular type of private land conservation: conservation easements. Conservation easements 
impose restrictions on land uses that prevent commercial development on enrolled lands. A 
conservation easement for agricultural purposes additionally requires agricultural production to 
continue on the enrolled lands. Federal, state, and local conservation easement programs 
incentivize enrollment by compensating landowners for placing an easement on their land. 
Federal programs like the Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP), a subsection of 
the United States Farm Bill Conservation Title, offer a one-time payment to enrollees. To be 
eligible to enroll in a federal conservation easement program the parcel must demonstrate one or 
more of the following four criteria: contain at least 0% prime, unique, statewide or locally 
important farmland; contain historical or archeological resources, protect grazing uses and 
related conservation values, or further a state or local policy consistent with the purposes of the 
program (NRCS, 2019). State and local programs often leverage federal payments and credits by 
offering additional compensation (NRCS, 2019). For example, Colorado offers additional state 
tax credits to eligible conservation easement program participants (Foley, 2018). Landowners 
often work with local governments or Land Trust Organizations, private organizations that 
manage and monitor conservation easements, to enroll in these federal, state, and local programs. 
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Land Trusts, landowners, and governments come together to conserve land through conservation 
easements. 
Farm Bill 
 According to Cain & Lovejoy (2004), since 1933 the United States Farm Bill has 
supported domestic agriculture through price supports and payments for idle land. The Farm Bill 
renews approximately every 5 years and has progressively incorporated support for more 
conservation practices and programs over the years. The first private land conservation program 
– the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) – started in 1985. The CRP originally aimed to 
reduce soil, increase wildlife habitat, and improve water quality. To achieve these goals, private 
lands enrolled in the CRP were idled for the 30-year agreement, and cover crops were planted in 
these idled fields to mitigate soil erosion. In return, the federal government compensated 
landowners who participated in the CRP (Cain & Lovejoy, 2004). 
 The National Resources Conservation Services (2019) (NRCS) explained that later 
iterations of the Farm Bill replaced the CRP model with a working lands model. The Farm and 
Ranch Land Protection Program (FRPP) (1996-2014), Grassland Reserve Program (GRP) (2002-
2014), and Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) (1990-2014). 2 These newer programs utilized the 
working lands conservation model, which aimed to achieve conservation benefits without 
requiring the landowner to stop production. In 2014, the Agricultural Conservation Easement 
Program (ACEP), which covers both Agricultural Land Easements (ALE) and Wetland Reserve 
Easements (WRE), replaced these programs for consolidation purposes (National Resources 
Conservation Services, 2019).  
                                               
2 For more information about the conservation easement program changes in the 2014 Farm Bill see for example 
Seidl & Villar (2014). 
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 Landowners who participate in the ACEP relinquish some of their private property rights. 
According to the NRCS (2019), conservation easement lands cannot be sold for development and 
even private construction projects are limited. Conservation easement restrictions last in 
perpetuity, unless state legislation restricts enrollments to 30 years. ACEP participants also 
create a conservation plan in collaboration with the NRCS, which administers ACEP (National 
Resources Conservation Services, 2019). These restrictions and requirements attempt to ensure 
that conservation easements achieve ACEP’s land conservation goals including slowing urban 
development and providing public environmental goods.  
 Although ACEP is a federally funded program, state legislation often dictates final 
details. Federal and state programs symbiotically create incentives for landowners to enroll land 
in a conservation easement. Federal programs set certain requirements for conservation 
easements such as evaluation of the easement and a conservation plan for the land. State 
programs leverage ACEP funding to achieve similar conservation goals. From our survey of a 
subset of conservation easements in Colorado, 65% of conservation easement payments came 
from state or local sources. Because of the state’s role in shaping conservation easement 
programs, I now explore Colorado’s history with conservation easements. 
Conservation Easements in Colorado 
 Colorado’s majestic Rocky Mountains and wide-open spaces attracted 80,000 new 
residents in 2018 (Tabachnik, 2018). Colorado is home of the iconic Rocky Mountain National 
Park and Pike’s Peak, but many smaller parks and open spaces also see heavy use. It should be of 
no surprise that this culture of nature appreciation has resulted in 2.4 million acres of private 
lands conserved through conservation easements as of 2018 – not to mention other public space 
preservation (Colorado Natural Heritage Program and the Geospatial Centroid, 2018).  
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 According to the NRCS (2019), Colorado conservation easements last in perpetuity and 
determines payments by fair market appraisal of the enrolled land. After an appraisal, an offer, 
which is a percentage of the difference between fair market value and the value in agriculture, is 
made to the landowner. Program participants often receive some percentage of the fair market 
value of their land depending on enrollment goals and prior year enrollment numbers (Foley, 
2018; Ramsey, 2018; NRCS, 2019).  
In 2000, Colorado was the first state to pass legislation allowing landowners to claim tax 
credits for enrolling their land in a conservation easement (Bleiberg, 2017). This legislation 
allowed participants to claim the difference between the fair market value and the conservation 
easement payment as a tax credit or sell those credits on a secondary market. Farmers, who often 
hold most of their wealth in land, took advantage of this program to convert a portion of that 
wealth into cash (Bleiberg, 2017; NRCS, 2019). Colorado legislation limits, or caps, the number 
of tax credits a landowner can claim for each parcel enrolled in the program (Bleiberg, 2017). 
Migoya (2012), Rice (2016), Bleiberg (2017), and Lewis (2018) explained how others 
took advantage of the Colorado tax credit program in an unintended way. Starting in 2003, 
legislation increased the cap on tax credit amount per easement from $100,000 to $260,000 (Ray 
et al., 2016). Landowners could now claim more of the difference between the fair market value 
of their land and the actual conservation easement payment. The potential for additional earnings 
caused some bad actors to partition properties to claim more conservation easements and claim 
more tax credits on each conservation easement. They effectively found a way to circumvent the 
tax credit cap. Additionally, the fair market appraisals did not meet the requirements and 
standards of the program. This led to some individuals receiving approximately $37 million in 
tax credits through fraudulent appraisal claims. Colorado required all these participants to pay 
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back taxes because the appraisers did not meet the program standards. These scandals tarnished 
the name of Colorado’s conservation easement programs and led to a series of lawsuits (Migoya, 
2012; Rice, 2016; Bleiberg, 2017; Lewis, 2018). 
Ray et al. (2016) and Bleiberg (2017) explained that in 2008 and 2013 Colorado passed 
additional legislation to redeem the program. This legislation established guidelines for 
appraisals, expanded oversight of the program, and introduced a cap for the annual budget of the 
conservation easement program at $45 million.3 Since the reform, this budget cap has never been 
reached in part due to insufficient state approved appraisers (Ray et al., 2016; Bleiberg, 2017). 
These program corrections led to new issues including longer application review times and 
stricter requirements for state appraisers, as outlined by an audit conducted by the Colorado 
Office of the State Auditor found in Ray et al. (2016). Due to previous appraisal abuse, land must 
be appraised by a state-approved appraiser. From January 2014 to June 2016 there were only 21 
state-approved appraisers, which is viewed by all parties as a constraint. Updated liability laws 
make appraisers hesitant to evaluate conservation easements. Currently, criticisms focus on 
application turnaround, with an average initial filing turnaround of 159 days in 2015. The 
program aims for an average time of 120 days, but applicants and conservation advocates have 
expressed frustration with the program’s timeliness. Applications often come at the end of the 
calendar year, and the few certified appraisers cannot keep up with the seasonal influx. Issues 
with the administrative budget have been reported, with a mismatch between projected and 
actual applications. Since application fees cover the administrative budget, application fees are 
determined by projected enrollment and incorrect lower projections impose higher costs on 
applicants. These high transaction costs make an effective barrier to entry, with the 2016 
                                               
3 For more information about the evolution of the budget cap see Ray et al. (2016). 
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application fee being $12,675 for the tax credit certificate and a preliminary opinion for appraisal 
or conservation purpose. Additionally, if landowners request a second appraisal these additional 
costs could run up to $10,000 to $30,000 (Ray et al., 2016).  These costs are large for small 
operation farmers and ranchers who might have ecologically important lands.  
In 2018 the Colorado House of Representatives passed a new bill (18-1291), which 
provides more oversight to the conservation easement program to ease the burden on landowners 
while protecting from fraudulent applications (Winter et al., 2018). Despite the risks and costs of 
the conservation easement program, Colorado remains committed to providing this type of land 
conservation.  
However, state tax credits only tell a portion of the story. Landowners also rely on federal 
programs like ACEP for compensation. State programs, such as Great Outdoors Colorado which 
helped secure the 2.4 million acres in Colorado, react to federal program requirements. State 
programs meet federal requirements so that participants can receive both federal and state 
compensation. Without both state and federal incentives working together, Colorado land 
conservation would have evolved differently. I now turn my attention to the federal methodology 
of conservation easement payments. 
Federal and State Programs: Conservation Easement Payments  
 The Agricultural Conservation Easement Program tries to achieve two main objectives: 
controlling urban development of open space and providing public benefits to society. Land is 
prioritized for conservation based on a number of metrics that try to quantify the importance of 
both of these objectives (NRCS, 2015). If the primary goal of ACEP is to control the 
development of open spaces then paying landowners the conservation easement’s opportunity 
cost would best accomplish this goal. However, if ACEP wishes to maximize the benefits 
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provided to society, they would prefer an alternative payment method, which compensates 
strictly based on those benefits. How does the current payment methodology achieve these two 
goals?   
  The NRCS (2015) and an interview with the Colorado NRCS Easements and Stewardship 
Coordinator Heather Foley (2018) explained the three different evaluation methods for 
determining conservation easement payments under the ALE subsection of ACEP. In each 
method, the value of the conservation easement is determined by the difference between the fair 
market value of the parcel with and without-easement, or opportunity cost of the easement.  
Evaluations can be conducted through individual appraisals, Area-Wide Market Analysis 
(AWMA), or an alternative method approved by the NRCS. Most commonly, state-approved 
appraisers estimate the with and without-easement fair market value of the land in its best use. 
Under the AWMA method, analysts examine sales records of lands with and without easements 
in the same market area with the same land use. This analysis provides an average value of 
similar conservation easements in the area. With robust market data and a multitude of 
conservation easement applications, this method can be more time and cost effective. Colorado 
exclusively uses individual appraisals due to insufficient market data for the AWMA method and 
substantial variation across parcels to be evaluated (National Resource Conservation Services, 
2015; Foley, 2018). 
 Lastly, ACEP allows for an alternative industry approved method, which gives flexibility 
for a new, more efficient method to be developed and the Wetland Reserve Easement division of 
ACEP provides an illustration of one potential alternative. The NRCS (2015) and an interview 
with the National Appraiser for the NRCS, Robert Ramsey (2018), explained the WRE allows 
for Geographic Area Rate Cap (GARC) estimates for easement value. GARC values categorize 
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conservation easements by land type and determine a fair market value for each land type in the 
geographic area by using an AWMA. The State Conservationist – the senior manager of NRCS 
conservation easements in the state – determines the market area boundaries and land use types 
included in the AWMA. From those base values, states have the freedom to adjust the percentage 
of the fair market value they will offer. For example, suppose Colorado’s GARC values are 70% 
of the AWMA this year, but enrollment is below the target amount. Then the State 
Conservationist can raise the GARC value for next year to 80% of the AWMA to entice more 
enrollment. The WRE program will then offer the landowner the lowest of the three values: fair 
market appraisal value, GARC, and the voluntary landowner offer (National Resource 
Conservation Services, 2015; Robert Ramsey, 2018). The GARC methodology is currently used 
in the WRE subdivision, so there is precedent within ACEP to use this alternative method. I 
focus my analysis on the GARC method and an alternative method that I propose. 
The GARC value is effectively the average opportunity cost of a land use in a market 
area. Economic theory suggests that this could induce the “lemons problem” first theorized by 
Akerlof (1970). The highest appraised lands will receive the average payment through GARC, so 
those landowners will not enroll in the program. However, the lowest appraised lands will also 
be valued at the average, which makes those landowners eager to enroll and receive higher 
compensation. This incentivizes low appraised lands to be enrolled and high appraised lands to 
refrain from enrollment (Akerlof, 1970). These appraisal values refer to the opportunity cost, so 
lands with high development potential would be considered high appraised lands. If the NRCS 
aims to protect land in areas of high development pressure, they would wish to enroll high 
opportunity cost lands and this methodology introduces the “lemons problem.” Similarly, if the 
NRCS prioritizes conservation of the most acres for the least cost, they are overpaying for 
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conservation easements using the GARC method. However, if the NRCS wishes to provide the 
most public benefits with conservation easements, the “lemons problem” might not be of concern 
with this method. The NRCS recognizes these potential issues but believes wetlands to be 
homogenous enough in a region for the impact to be negligible (Robert Ramsey, 2018). 
To illustrate how GARC values are created, I consider a simple case: the WRE program 
in Georgia. Easement specialist at the Georgia NRCS, Sharon Swagger (2018), explained in an 
interview how GARC values were created for the WRE program in Georgia. An internal 
economist at the Georgia NRCS office created 11 different market regions based on 
socioeconomic variables and land values. These market regions align unintentionally with the 
physiogeographic regions of Georgia. Next, the NRCS office analyzed previous wetland 
conservation easements in Georgia and identified two land use types from the pool of 
applications – forest land and agricultural land. These 11 market areas and two land types were 
given to Williams and Associates, a third-party appraisal company, who conducted an AWMA. 
An NRCS state committee decided that they would offer 80% of the AWMA value as the GARC 
value (Sharon Swagger, 2018). 
 Ramsey (2018) explained that due to the complex nature of conservation easement 
evaluations, landowners and NRCS offices want the process to be somewhat nuanced. 
Landowners who believe they have high-value land want higher compensation, and funders do 
not want to overcompensate low opportunity cost parcels. Methods like GARC work effectively 
for homogenous land, but the NRCS believes agricultural lands are too heterogenous. As such, 
NRCS believes that individual appraisals are in the best interest of both parties. Land Trust 
organizations push back on that rationale. They argue that the GARC methodology prevents 
small operation farmers or ranchers from conserving their land. The NRCS administration, Land 
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Trusts, and conservationists prioritize avoiding overcompensation, reducing complexity and 
transaction costs, and maximizing ecological benefits, respectively (Robert Ramsey, 2018). 
These potentially conflicting goals spark an interest in alternative compensation mechanisms. 
Economic theory suggests that compensating for the opportunity cost of conservation 
easements would maximize the number of acres preserved for the minimum amount of 
compensation. Theoretically, the current method allows the government to protect the most land 
for the least cost to taxpayers. On the other hand, compensating landowners for the public 
benefits they provide would create a market for those benefits. These two theoretical viewpoints 
create bounds for conservation easement compensation. In between these two theoretical bounds 
exist infinitely many compensation mechanisms. I propose a hybrid mechanism that aims to 
compensate landowners for some ecological benefits at the expense of higher cost to taxpayers. 
This methodology would create a market for ecosystem services provided by agricultural land. 
Colorado has taken advantage of the federal ACEP program to provide the public 
benefits of working landscapes. The complicated history of conservation easements in Colorado 
led to legislative reform and cautious use of state budget allocated for conservation easements. 
This legislative reform introduced additional requirements, which have created barriers for 
smaller landowners to consider enrollment in a conservation easement. This unintended 
consequence may not conflict with federal and state program goals, if they aim to provide the 
most conserved land for the least cost. The federal payment mechanisms suggest this might be 
the case as all methods rely on the fair market value of the land. However, alternative payment 
mechanisms could provide more benefits by creating a market for ecological benefits provided 








 Legislative interest has turned to the benefits conservation easements provide to Colorado 
and potential alternative payment mechanisms (Ray et al., 2016). In order to address these 
economic consequences of conservation easements, I turn to the existing literature to determine 
the best practices for assessing the economic impact of conservation easement payments, 
estimating the willingness to pay for conservation easements in Colorado, and approximating the 
ecological benefits provided by conservation easements. The economic impact of ACEP has not 
been assessed previously, so I look at the CRP literature to understand the subtleties and 
assessment of the economic impact. Next, I look at the non-market valuation literature to 
understand how researchers estimate a willingness to pay for any non-market good and 
conservation easements in particular. Finally, I review how ecosystems provide services, how 
researchers estimate the value of those services, and techniques to use existing ecosystem service 
values to estimate the ecological benefits provided by conservation easements. Then I look at the 
ecological conservation literature to assess the validity of using these economic techniques as 
well as alternative conservation tools. 
Economic Impact 
 Perhaps the most important yet under-explored question regarding conservation easement 
is the economic impact that they have. Although economic impact analysis has not been 
conducted on ACEP specifically, researchers have analyzed ACEP’s ancestor, the CRP. These 
two conservation programs differ mechanically, as I will explore, but are similar enough to 
inform expectations and analysis. In addition to the economic impact of ACEP on Colorado, I 
emphasize the effect on rural Colorado. Previous research finds mixed outcomes regarding the 
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effect of conservation easement programs on rural communities (e.g., Devino, 1988; Mortensen, 
1989; Myers, 1989; Broomhall, 1991; Hyberg et al., 1991; Martin, 1998). Lastly, I discuss 
reported survey results on conservation easement payment uses and how these expenditure 
profiles inform economic impact analyses. 
The economic impact of the CRP has been well studied (e.g., Devino, 1988; Mortensen, 
1989; Myers, 1989; Broomhall, 1991; Hyberg et al., 1991; Martin, 1998). The economic impact 
of the CRP occurred during three distinct phases. Initially, landowners received compensation 
and simultaneously idled agricultural lands which in turn decreased production resulting in both 
a positive and negative economic impact. Subsequently, cover crop establishment generated 
some economic activity as farmers purchased seeds and other inputs to maintain the crop cover. 
Lastly, landowners were faced with a decision to return the land to production or keep it idle. If 
the land did not return to production, then there were further negative long-term economic 
impacts. These economic phases are specific to the CRP due to program requirements. Most 
researchers found a negative economic impact of the CRP (Devino, 1988; Mortensen, 1989; 
Broomhall, 1991; Hyberg et al., 1991; Martin, 1998), with one study finding a positive economic 
impact (Myers, 1989).  
In contrast, the short-term impacts of ACEP conservation easements consist of a one-time 
financial injection to landowners. Researchers have not evaluated monetarily additional long-
term impacts of ACEP conservation easements. The CRP literature suggests ACEP should 
produce a positive economic impact. With the freedom to continue agricultural production, 
landowners receive additional money for retiring development rights.  
While I expect the overall economic impact of ACEP to be positive, research shows that 
a larger scale of analysis might produce results inconsistent with smaller towns. Henderson 
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(1992) considered how the CRP might affect the number of businesses in rural communities of 
different sizes. Intuitively, residents of smaller communities travel to diverse shopping centers in 
larger communities. The CRP payments benefited businesses in larger communities and 
negatively affected smaller community businesses. Though a program might have a positive total 
economic impact, certain communities might experience growing pains as incentives shift 
(Henderson, 1992).  
Even within the same county, communities will experience conservation programs 
differently. Hamilton (1998) found that at the county level the CRP did not affect economic well-
being significantly as defined by median household income and percent in poverty. At the sub-
county scale, the CRP negatively affected economic well-being, showing that specific 
communities will feel the economic effects while larger scales might not (Hamilton, 1998). 
Further, Martin (1988) considered the economic effect on three counties in Oregon and 
concluded different effects for each county. Martin attributed this difference to the composition 
of the counties’ economies. One county containing an agricultural supply center suffered more 
due to the decrease in agricultural input expenditures (Martin, 1998). The scale of analysis 
affects the conclusions that are drawn, and even if a program has positive economic effects, an 
individual community may have a different experience. Although I don’t expect any community 
to see a negative economic impact from ACEP, these CRP studies highlight the importance of 
understanding community-level differences and how recipients use their conservation easement 
payments. Purchasing goods in Denver will impact rural communities differently than 
purchasing local goods. 
Researchers have recognized the importance of the expenditure profile when conducting 
an economic impact analysis (Martin, 1998). Unfortunately, expenditure categories for ACEP 
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payment uses vary across studies, but average percentages can still inform a priori expectations. 
Esseks et al. (2013) found that 69% of participants used a portion of the payment for personal or 
household expenditures and 84% of participants used a portion for agricultural improvements or 
inputs. Similarly, Duke et al. (2016) found that 64% of participants used the money for personal 
goods but found a much smaller proportion, 48%, of participants used the money for agricultural 
expenses. Clark (2010) found that 77% of participants used the payments toward savings or 
investment. 
 In addition to understanding conservation easement payment expenditures, previous 
research tries to understand changes in farming practices. Due to increased income or 
conservation practice requirements, farmers and ranchers might change their operation. Clark 
(2010) found that 17% of Ohio participants diversified their crops and 21% added farming 
businesses with their easement payments. Similarly, Esseks et al. (2013) found that 18% of 
surveyed participants diversified crops, 16% decreased diversification, and of those who added 
crops, 25% added specialty crops.  
 Since few researchers have analyzed ACEP easements, I turn to the broader conservation 
easement literature to guide my analysis. The literature shows the importance of incorporating 
surveyed expenditure profiles into the economic analysis. Previous research sets a priori 
expectations for the economic impact analysis results and potential discrepancies among specific 
communities. 
 Economic impact analysis, risks of fraudulent conservation easement claims, and costs to 
taxpayers help give some context to the discussion of conservation easements. However, if 
taxpayers are not willing to pay for conservation easements then these metrics become irrelevant. 
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Next, I discuss the theoretical basis for estimating Coloradoans’ willingness to pay for 
conservation easements.   
Willingness to Pay for Conservation Easements 
How do we put a dollar amount on non-market goods such as open space or preserving a 
farm for future generations? Economists cannot directly value non-market goods, such as the 
bundle of goods that agricultural land conservation provide such as environmental benefits. 
Instead, researchers try to derive how much individuals theoretically would pay for the non-
market good, or goods not traded in the market (Peterson, 2003). Accordingly, I conducted a 
meta-analysis to estimate this value from previous results in the literature. However, my estimate 
relies on the validity of other researchers’ estimates. Thus, I turn to a discussion of the types of 
values people place on goods, how researchers try to estimate values of nonmarket goods, and 
estimated values of willingness to pay (WTP) for agricultural land. 
The literature separates the total value of a good into different attributes. For example, a 
good can have use and nonuse values. For example, someone living in Colorado might regularly 
hike in Rocky Mountain National Park and put a value on the park as a place to hike. 
Alternatively, someone living in Washington, D.C. might never visit Rocky Mountain National 
Park but would place some value on the park’s existence. Nonuse values can be further broken 
down into option value, bequest value, and existence value. People place some value on Rocky 
Mountain National Park because they have the option to visit someday. On the other hand, 
people place value on Rocky Mountain National Park because they want the park to be available 
to future generations. Lastly, people place some inherent value on the park knowing it exists 
even if they don’t have the intention to visit. The differentiation between use and non-use values 
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complicate researchers’ attempts to value non-market goods, but modern surveys and techniques 
can capture specific values or the total value.  
Richter (1996), Boxall et al. (1996), and Loomis & Walsh (1997) outlined the two 
approaches to estimate values of non-market goods: stated preference and revealed preference. 
Stated preference methods ask people directly how much they are willing to pay (WTP) for the 
non-market good in question. This method allows researchers to survey participants and estimate 
non-use values such as option, bequest, and existence values. Revealed preference methods 
derive the good’s value by observing people’s actions rather than words. This second approach 
uses entrance fees and travel costs along with other methods to estimate use values. Revealed 
preference methods correct for respondents who might overstate how much they are willing to 
pay to show support for the certain good or program. However, stated preference methods have 
limitations of their own due to the hypothetical nature of the response elicitation (Richter, 1966; 
Boxall et al., 1996; Loomis & Walsh, 1997). Researchers utilize both methods to understand and 
decompose values according to their objectives. Since I derive a WTP estimate, I continue an in-
depth exploration of stated preference methods. 
 Most commonly, researchers use the contingent valuation method (CVM) from a large 
number of stated preference methods. Contingent valuation surveys ask respondents directly how 
much they would pay for a certain quantity or level of the nonmarket good. The survey response 
values include all applicable use and nonuse values that the respondent might place on the good. 
In the context of conservation easements, CVM studies allow researchers to estimate the nonuse 
value respondents place on conservation easement programs. These responses estimate how 
much people would be theoretically willing to pay in taxes or other payment mechanisms to 
support the program. Other stated preference methods used in the conservation easement 
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literature include iterative bidding models (Halstead, 1984), conjoint analysis and similar choice 
experiments (Duke & Ilvento, 2004; Roe et al., 2004; Johnston & Duke, 2007b). All these stated 
preference methods elicit nonuse values for agricultural land. 
Researchers also use other revealed preference methods such as hedonic pricing models, 
which compare housing prices with relative distance to a natural amenity, to elicit values for 
agricultural conservation easements. However, the literature debates the appropriate use of 
revealed preference models or hedonic pricing models in this context due to the inability to 
capture all nonuse values (Ready et al., 1997; Johnston et al., 2001; Johnston & Duke, 2007b). 
Revealed preference study results could not be incorporated into the meta-analysis. 
 Researchers have derived WTP for agricultural conservation easements and agricultural 
land generally through CVM surveys. Although researchers may use the same CVM techniques, 
small differences in study methodology confound comparisons. I considered the WTP for 
agricultural land preservation as the WTP for a conservation easement on that land. In this way, 
both types of CVM studies elicit similar WTP estimates. Researchers have studied various 
geographic areas from the ranches of Colorado to the farmland of Delaware (Bittner et al., 2006; 
Johnston & Duke, 2009). Studies also elicit responses from different scales, from a single city to 
an entire state. Johnston & Duke (2009) found that the spatial scale can be a driving factor of 
WTP estimates due to differences in attitude toward members of the same community versus the 
same state. Their results suggest that estimates of WTP per capita for a county in Delaware are 
more similar to a county in Connecticut than the state of Delaware.  
Survey precision also affects WTP estimates. Ambiguous surveys fail to clarify if they 
estimated the marginal WTP for an additional acre of farmland or the WTP for all current 
farmland (Champ, 2003). Variations in research methods, geographic areas, and study scales 
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complicate comparisons across the CVM literature. After converting to 2018 dollars, WTP 
estimates range from less than a penny per household per acre per year for a sparsely populated, 
agricultural county in Colorado (Bittner et al., 2006) to $12.57 per household per acre per year 
for a small town in Massachusetts with very few acres of agricultural land (Halstead, 1984). 
 Coloradoans’ willingness to pay for agricultural conservation easements gives context to 
the rest of my results. Their WTP captures all public nonuse values they might place on parcels 
protected by conservation easements. This implies that an estimate of this WTP would also 
estimate the maximum amount Coloradoans would pay for a conservation easement program. 
Though CVM studies vary methodologically, meta-analytic techniques address some sources of 
these variations and allow estimation of a WTP for Coloradoans. This WTP estimate gives 
greater context to the costs and benefit estimates of conservation easement programs in 
Colorado. 
 The primary public benefit of land conservation can be captured through ecosystem 
service valuation. I estimated the value of these benefits using a benefit transfer methodology, 
which uses estimates from the literature in the context of Colorado. Next, I explore ecosystem 
services and how researchers attempt to estimate monetary values for those services. 
Ecosystem Services 
 Ecosystems provide many market and non-market services from aesthetic enjoyment to 
supporting wildlife habitat. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2004) divided these 
services into four categories: provisioning, regulating, supporting, and cultural services. 
Provisioning services encompass consumable resources and provide many market goods. 
Cultural services are benefits provided directly to humans such as recreation and aesthetic views. 
Ecosystems provide supporting services, which encompass many non-market goods that 
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indirectly affect society such as erosion prevention, air quality, and climate regulation. These 
ecosystem services interact with society to produce benefits. Erosion prevention improves soil 
and water quality, which provides benefits to farmers by increasing productivity. No value would 
be produced without humans to benefit from these services. Changes to these ecosystems, such 
as development, result in valuable tradeoffs from these ecosystem services to an alternative use.  
 Researchers have estimated ecosystem service values for several decades. Farber et al. 
(2002) summarized relevant concepts and methodology for ecosystem service valuation studies. 
They argued that assigning economic values to ecological services might not align in a perfectly 
coherent manner. For instance, the economic value of resource harvesting might outweigh the 
ecological values of the ecosystem health. However, it is often argued that a value with some 
methodological issues is better than an implicit $0 value of ecosystems. Researchers conduct 
primary valuation studies using the following methods:  
1. Avoided Cost (AC) – a value is assigned to the services based on the costs 
incurred in their absence. 
2. Replacement Cost (RC) – a value is assigned to the services based on the costs to 
provide those services through other means. 
3. Factor Income (FI) – a value is assigned based on increased income due to the 
presence or increase in ecosystem service. 
4. Travel Cost (TC) – the demand for a service is deduced by the costs incurred by 
traveling to an ecosystem. 
5. Hedonic Pricing (HP) – the value of a service is deduced by comparing housing 
prices to the relative proximity of a house to an ecosystem. 
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6. Contingent Valuation (CV) – willingness to pay (WTP) for services are deduced 
based on survey results of a hypothetical scenario. 
7. Ecological Accounting (EA) – values for services are derived based on the natural 
energy required to provide such services 
Researchers employ these methods to value a subset of ecosystem services or the total value of 
the ecosystem which encompasses all applicable services (Farber et al, 2002).   
 Ideally, an original study could be conducted measuring the ecosystem services provided 
by the specific study site and estimating a value of those services. However, due to budgetary 
and temporal constraints, policymakers often use benefit transfer methodologies. Benefit transfer 
analyses find ecosystem service values from similar study sites and apply them to the site of 
interest. Benefit transfers can be a function of site characteristics and population, a mix and 
match of service values from other sites, or some similar type of methodology. The accuracy, 
best practices, and criticisms of benefit transfers have been well studied. Proponents argue that a 
benefit transfer analysis can produce accurate results if it includes every detail of study site 
characteristics, but critics argue that benefit transfer is most often misused and values 
inappropriately applied to study sites with very different characteristics (e.g., Boyle and 
Bergstrom, 1992; Loomis, 1992; Downing and Ozuna, 1996; Plummer, 2009; Richardson et al., 
2015).  
Given these criticisms, researchers have since turned to meta-analyses of ecosystem 
service valuation studies to increase their accuracy of estimated benefits across a wider variety of 
contexts. Meta-analyses provide a method of summarizing a large database of values, and the 
result produces an ecosystem service value based on certain characteristics of the land. Nelson 
and Kennedy (2009) criticized some inappropriate uses of meta-analyses, but when used 
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correctly they outperform other benefit transfer methods (Rosenberger & Loomis, 2000). 
Wetlands are the most prevalent example of ecosystem service valuation meta-analyses due to 
the numerous primary research studies (Brouwer et al., 1999; Woodward and Wui, 2001; 
Brander et al., 2006; Ghermandi et al., 2010; Brander et al., 2012; Chaikumbung et al., 2016). 
Due to data constraints, meta-analyses have not been conducted with other ecosystems. Although 
previous research suggests a meta-analysis of ecosystem service valuations would be preferable 
to a benefit transfer, sufficient data relevant to Colorado does not exist to conduct such a study.  
Conservation easements are well studied within the ecological conservation literature 
compared to other, newer conservation techniques. Conservationists are not as familiar with 
conservation tools other than conservation easements, so conservation easements are the most 
popular among land trusts and other conservationist groups (Bennett et al., 2018). However, 
conservation easements are not always the most appropriate land conservation tool across all 
contexts (Bennett et al., 2018). Research has also studied the efficacy of conservation easements 
in reaching ecological goals (e.g., Kiesecker et al., 2007; Wallace et al., 2008).   
Ecologists have studied many of the assumptions that economists have made regarding 
ecosystem services as well. Research has found that ecosystem services are often closely 
intertwined (e.g., Brščić, 2006; Wolf et al., 2007; Kramer et al., 1997; Rickets et al., 2008; Engel 
et al., 2005; Hughes et al., 2005; Enfors et al., 2008; Clark et al., 1979; del-Val et al., 2006; 
Bennett et al., 2009). Programs that affect one ecosystem service might impact other services not 
specifically targeted (Barbier et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2006). Ecosystem services vary widely 
among the same ecosystem land cover type (Koch et al., 2009; Nelson et al., 2009; Naidoo et al., 
2008; Egoh et al., 2008). Clearly ecological systems are more complicated than simply looking 
at a broad land cover definition and applying a number. However, I used this benefit transfer 
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methodology despite this fact because quantifying the value of ecosystem services is better than 
making the implicit assumption that there is no value. 
Quantifying ecosystem service values captures most of the benefits of conservation 
easements. Along with costs, WTP estimates, and the economic impact in rural counties, these 
economic consequences contextualize the conservation easement program and justify the risks 
and costs. 
 In conclusion, the literature provides insight into the economic consequences of ACEP. 
Prior CRP studies outline the potential economic impacts of easement payments. Researchers use 
survey techniques to elicit willingness to pay values which can be used in a meta-analysis to 
estimate values in new contexts. Lastly, although better alternatives exist in theory, benefit 
transfer techniques can be used to estimate ecological benefits in the absence of other options. 
Next, I describe the methods I use to estimate the economic consequences of ACEP. 
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 I analyzed the economic impact of conservation easements in Colorado in two stages. 
First, I surveyed Colorado landowners who had received conservation payments to obtain an 
expenditure profile of how the conservation payments were used. Second, I used IMPLAN for a 
single region analysis of Colorado and a multi-region analysis of rural and urban Colorado to 
estimate the economic impacts of conservation easements from 2009 to 2017. 
 In Colorado, 122 parcels were enrolled in a federal agricultural conservation easement 
program between 2009 and 2017. I surveyed a sample of 67 landowners (of the total 122) of the 
easements held by my partners in the Colorado land trust community. Not all land trusts were 
interested in participating in this partnership, so I could not survey all landowners. This sample 
of 67 landowners represents all landowners who worked with my land trust partners. Easement 
holders include the Colorado Cattlemen’s Agricultural Land Trust (CCALT), Colorado Open 
Lands (COL), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Colorado West Land Trust (CWLT), Yampa 
Valley Land Trust (YVLT), and Palmer Land Trust (Palmer). This partnership with the land 
trusts allowed me to send the survey to conservation easement grantors from a known and trusted 
organization, potentially improving response rates. The survey consisted of ten questions, which 
captured how participants spent their easement payment, how their production practices changed, 
as well as new sources of income resulting from the easement payments. The survey instrument 
is found in Appendix B. The survey instrument was approved by the Colorado State University 
Research Integrity and Compliance Review Office (RICRO ID # 223-18H, Category 2 exempt). 
I distributed surveys according to the Dillman method, following the survey-postcard-survey 
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approach, and administered in partnership with the land trust holding the easement (Dillman et 
al., 2014).  
Contact information was available for 65 of the 67 landowners. Of the 65 landowners 
surveyed, 43 surveys were returned with usable responses for an effective response rate of 
66.15%. Survey results were combined with information related to the easement grantor 
contained in the land trust’s database. Land trust data related to the easement included: county, 
year easement was recorded, federal funding amount, federal program, and match amount from 
other state and local level partners.  
Although I had a high response rate of 66.15% of those sampled, non-response bias could 
affect the data. Easement grantors who did not respond might have certain characteristics 
compared to respondents (Champ, 2003). Since I have basic data for the sample of easements, I 
tested to see if non-respondents received a significantly different amount of federal funds as 
compared to respondents. I concluded that there is not a statistically significant difference 
between respondents and non-respondents with a p-value of 0.38. That is, the probability that the 
two groups are the same based on federal fund amounts is 38%, so I failed to reject the 
hypothesis that they are statistically the same. Similarly, I failed to reject that the two groups are 
the same based on the appraised value of the easement (p=0.51), number of acres enrolled in the 
easement (p=0.89), and the calendar year the land was enrolled (p=0.77). 
Rural-Urban Continuum Codes (RUCC) classify counties based on their population and 
geographic location near urban centers. A RUCC score of 1 signifies a metro county with a 
population greater than 1 million while a score of 9 signifies a county not adjacent to a metro 
county with less than a 2,500 urban population. Unsurprisingly, the survey found that more 
easements are in rural areas (Figure 4.1), with 62% of all easements located in a county with a 
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RUCC score of 7 or greater. Further, 60% of acres under federally supported easements are in 
these rural counties, and 81% of federal easement money goes to these counties. Only three of 
the conservation easements were located in counties with a RUCC score of less than 3. This 
finding supports the contention that federally supported agricultural conservation easement funds 
are used in Colorado for the environmental public good ecosystem services generated from 
agricultural lands in rural counties, rather than as an urban planning or growth management tool.  
 
Figure 4.1. Colorado Conservation Easement Sample Map 
 
 Responses were used to construct proportions of conservation easement payments spent 
in eight different categories: reinvested in agricultural production, invested in non-agricultural 
enterprise, agricultural expansion, savings, family education, debt, non-business goods, and 
other. Survey respondents reported the percentage of conservation easement compensation in the 
eight categories found in Table 4.1. All expenditures were assumed to occur locally in the same 








the proportion of their easement payment invested back into their 
agricultural operation. This can come in the form of the purchase of 
inputs such as livestock, labor, equipment or other infrastructure such as 
irrigation equipment. 
Diversification  the proportion of their easement payment invested in non-farmland based 
enterprise diversification. This can take the form of adding agritourism, 




the proportion of their easement compensation invested in the purchase 
or lease of additional land to expand their agricultural operation. 
Education  the proportion of their easement compensation used toward the post- 
high school education of a family member. 
Savings  the proportion of their easement payment invested in savings, which 
could include retirement funds, the stock market as well as savings 
accounts. 




the proportion of their easement payment spent on retail goods such as 
recreational vehicles, vacations or a second home. 
Other  Respondents were asked to indicate what their other expenditures were if 
this category was selected and responded with expenses such as 
charitable giving, daily expenses, and attorneys. 
 
I extrapolated to the entire population of conservation easements in Colorado. I did not 
have data on the 55 conservation easements outside of the sample and could not conduct more 
rigorous tests to check for differences between the two groups. Since I found no evidence that 
respondents differed from non-respondents in the sample, I concluded that the sample is 
representative of the entire population. As such, I assumed that the entire $80.8 million federal 
conservation easement dollars were spent in the same manner as the sample of $36.5 million in 
order to get a state level estimate of the economic impact. The sample comprised 55% of all 
conservation easements, 62% of acres enrolled, and 45% of federal easement dollars. A 
comparison of data from the population of Colorado conservation easements and the sample is 
found in Tables 4.2 - 4.5. 
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Table 4.2. Comparison of Conservation Easement Population and Sample (Total) 
Year Total easements Acres Nominal Federal dollars  
Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample 
2009 27 2 12488 1896 $5,563,500 $1,047,084 
2010 10 6 26013 2436 $6,515,900 $1,809,649 
2011 35 14 48687 2664 $8,484,000 $4,671,087 
2012 6 13 15294 12541 $7,172,800 $3,481,337 
2013 9 7 2465 10712 $16,049,700 $2,253,616 
2014 7 4 5182 4308 $4,182,000 $1,823,525 
2015 9 10 3184 22047 $4,353,200 $8,803,452 
2016 10 3 6185 2028 $12,962,500 $1,449,120 
2017 9 4 9213 6346 $9,198,900 $5,924,000 
2018 0 4 0 14736 $0 $2,562,500 
Total 122 67 128710 79714 $74,482,500 $33,825,370 
 
Table 4.3. Comparison of Conservation Easement Population and Sample (FRPP) 
Year FRPP easements FRPP acres FRPP dollars  
Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample 
2009 26 2 7012 1896 $5,541,100 $1,047,084 
2010 6 6 13152 2436 $6,451,900 $1,809,649 
2011 34 14 36483 2664 $8,394,700 $4,671,087 
2012 5 12 14267 4663 $7,134,400 $3,193,337 
2013 2 6 1007 3038 $16,036,900 $1,853,616 
2014 0 4 0 4308 $9,800 $1,823,525 
2015 0 8 0 21870 $396,600 $8,398,000 
2016 0 1 0 1727 $0 $600,000 
2017 0 1 0 1573 $0 $800,000 
2018 0 1 0 186 $0 $762,500 











Table 4.4. Comparison of Conservation Easement Population and Sample (GRP) 
Year GRP easements GRP acres GRP dollars  
Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample 
2009 1 0 5476 0 $22,400 $0 
2010 4 0 12862 0 $64,000 $0 
2011 1 0 12203 0 $89,300 $0 
2012 1 1 1028 7878 $38,400 $288,000 
2013 7 1 1458 7674 $12,800 $400,000 
2014 0 0 0 0 $174,700 $0 
2015 0 0 0 0 $0 $0 
2016 0 0 0 0 $13,500 $0 
2017 0 0 0 0 $22,500 $0 
2018 0 0 0 0 $0 $0 
Total 14 2 33027 15552 $437,600 $688,000 
 
Table 4.5. Comparison of Conservation Easement Population and Sample (ACEP) 
Year ACEP easements ACEP acres ACEP dollars  
Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample 
2009 0 0 0 0 $0 $0 
2010 0 0 0 0 $0 $0 
2011 0 0 0 0 $0 $0 
2012 0 0 0 0 $0 $0 
2013 0 0 0 0 $0 $0 
2014 7 0 5182 0 $3,997,500 $0 
2015 9 2 3184 177 $3,956,600 $405,452 
2016 10 2 6185 301 $12,949,000 $849,120 
2017 9 3 9213 4773 $9,176,400 $5,124,000 
2018 0 3 0 14550 $0 $1,800,000 
Total 35 10 23763 19801 $30,079,500 $8,178,572 
 
Sample data were reported at the time the landowner received the federal payment. 
Population data were obtained from the NRCS and were reported at the time the financial 
obligation was made. Due to time lags, these may not be the same date, and as such the same 
conservation easement may be recorded in different fiscal years based on the data source. 
 I used Economic Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) data and software to assess the 
economic impact of conservation easements in Colorado from 2009 to 2017. IMPLAN uses data 
from industries concerning what commodities they purchase (IMPLAN, 2004). This allows 
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IMPLAN to track how an increase in an industry’s demand will affect other related industries. 
For example, an increase in local agricultural demand will translate into an increase in demand 
for agricultural support goods such as tractors. The total economic impact will be composed of 
direct, indirect, and induced effects. The direct effect is defined as the initial increase in demand. 
The indirect effect is the increase in demand for related industries. The induced effect captures 
the increase in output due to increased wages in the region. For example, the increase in 
agricultural demand might cause farmers and ranchers to hire temporary labor which increases 
the income for those laborers. That additional income is reintroduced into the economy as 
demand for other goods and services. Economists define this as the induced effect (IMPLAN, 
2004).  
 General Input-Output modeling, such as IMPLAN, analyzes the effect of outside money 
on a regional economy. For example, the effect of conservation easements funded by Colorado 
tax dollars would not have an economic impact on Colorado by definition. Such a program is 
simply transferring dollars within the economy from taxpayers to conservation easement holders. 
A transfer introduces no additional money into the economy. As such, I restrict my IMPLAN 
analysis to federally funded conservation easements. Note that these easements leverage state 
dollars and state tax credits; however, I only considered the federal portion of compensation to 
conservation easement holders. 
IMPLAN data describe county-level industry transactions and allow for basic analyses. 
An advantage of using IMPLAN is the timeliness and ease with which an economic impact can 
be estimated. Other Input-Output modeling, such as Computable General Equilibrium, can allow 




Table 4.6. Total Direct Expenditures by Category 
Expenditure Category Total Direct Expenditures 
Investment in Agriculture $12,214,544 
Diversification $891,519 
Land Purchase/Real estate $10,681,438 
Savings and Debt $55,811,421 




I used the direct expenditure profile shown in Table 4.6 to ‘shock’ each expenditure 
category in the Input-Output model and determine the multiplier (indirect and induced) effects of 
the spending. The IMPLAN Input-Output model contains 529 different sectors of the economy, 
which is more detailed than the survey of easement grantors was able to capture. To create the 
expenditure categories in IMPLAN, I aggregated existing IMPLAN sectors to create categories 
for each of the types of expenditures included in the survey. Table 4.7 lists the IMPLAN sectors 












Table 4.7. Crosswalk Between Survey Responses and IMPLAN Sectors 
Survey category Aggregate 
Sector Name 
Code Description 
“Invested back into the ag operation 
through purchases of inputs 
(including restocking livestock 
herds), labor, equipment or other 




2 Grain farming 
 
 4 Fruit farming  
 11 Beef cattle ranching and 
farming, including feedlots 
and dual-purpose ranching 
and farming  
 19 Support activities for 
agriculture and forestry  
 262 Farm machinery and 
equipment manufacturing 
“Purchase of non-business related 
goods (e.g., recreational vehicle, 
vacation, second home)” or “Other” 
Retail 396 Retail - Motor vehicle and 
parts dealers 
 
 397 Retail - Furniture and home 
furnishings stores  
 398 Retail - Electronics and 
appliance stores  
 399 Retail - Building material 
and garden equipment and 
supplies stores  
 400 Retail - Food and beverage 
stores  
 401 Retail - Health and personal 
care stores  
 402 Retail - Gasoline stores  
 403 Retail - Clothing and 
clothing accessories stores  
 404 Retail - Sporting goods, 
hobby, musical instrument 
and book stores  
 405 Retail - General 
merchandise stores  
 406 Retail - Miscellaneous store 
retailers  
 407 Retail - Nonstore retailers 
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“Invested in savings (could include 
retirement fund or stock market 
investment as well as savings 
accounts)” and “Pay down farm 
debt” 




 434 Nondepository credit 
intermediation and related 
activities  
 435 Securities and commodity 
contracts intermediation and 
brokerage  
 436 Other financial investment 
activities 
“Invested in post-high-school 
education of a family member” 
Education 472 Elementary and secondary 
schools  
 473 Junior colleges, colleges, 
universities, and 
professional schools  
 474 Other educational services 
“Invested in non-farm land-based 





496 Other amusement and 
recreation industries 
 
 500 Other accommodations 
“Charitable donations” Charity 513 Religious organizations  
 514 Grantmaking, giving, and 
social advocacy 
organizations 
“Invested in the purchase or lease of 
additional land to expand the ag 
operation” 
Real Estate 440 Real Estate 
 
 The analysis goes further by comparing the impact of these federal dollars on rural and 
urban counties separately. I used the Economic Research Service’s (ERS) RUCC definitions of 
metro and non-metro counties to identify rural and urban counties. Urban counties are defined as 
counties with one or more urban center with a population of 50,000 or more or 25% of the 
workforce in a county commutes to a neighboring urban county. This definition corresponds to 
Rural-Urban Continuum Codes of 1-3. I checked the robustness of this by adjusting the limit. 
The data contain no counties with a RUCC score of 4 or 5 and one county with a RUCC score of 
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6. This provides a clear image of the divide between urban and rural and does not change the 
results. 
I conducted a Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) analysis through the IMPLAN 
software. This analysis captures feedback, or economic spillovers, from one region to another. 
The MRIO analysis considers two regions: the primary region where the initial shock occurs and 
the periphery region where economic impact occurs only due to spillover effects. For example, 
consider a shock to rural counties in Colorado. A portion of that shock creates demand in urban 
counties or the periphery region. Similarly, that new demand in urban counties creates demand in 
rural counties. This feedback loop continues indefinitely, with each impact shrinking in 
magnitude. MRIO analysis captures this economic impact by including inter-regional trading.  
 Multi-region analysis through the IMPLAN software does not allow for shocking 
aggregated sectors. I disaggregated and shocked individual sectors in IMPLAN to find the key 
sectors driving the aggregated results. Analysis was required to show which sectors best 
represented the single region IMPLAN results. I used these sectors that most closely match the 
original total output results as reported later in the results. The MRIO model used these 
representative sectors of the original categories. I could have used another criterion to determine 
the representative sectors, such as employment, but the primary analysis focuses on total output. 
This choice means I do not expect other results, such as changes in employment, to match the 
initial single region analysis. 
Spillover coefficients measure the impact on the periphery region when shocking the 
primary region. Often when conducting Multi-Region Input-Output analysis researchers provide 
spillover coefficients to describe the connections of the involved regions (Hughes & Litz, 1996). 
Sectors in rural regions tend to have stronger ties to urban regions than vice versa. I define the 
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Urban model as the IMPLAN model where urban counties are the primary region and rural 
counties are the peripheral region. I define the Rural model in the corresponding way, where the 
rural counties are the primary region.  
 I calculated and report spillover coefficients for both regions of the MRIO analysis. 
Spillover coefficients provide a measure of how much the direct impact in the primary region 
spills over to the periphery or secondary region. I calculated the spillover coefficients for each 
sector that will be shocked later in the analysis. To calculate the spillover coefficients, I shocked 
the sectors and found the magnitude of impacts in both the primary and periphery regions 
relative to the direct injection. Next, I took the proportion of the impact in the periphery region to 
the sum of the impact in the periphery region and the impact in the primary region less the direct 
impact of the primary region. The following equation is used to calculate spillover coefficients: 
𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑦 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 − 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦  
Where Total refers to the total impact from the shock in the primary region and Direct refers to 
the direct impact of the shock, or the amount of the initial shock, in the primary region.  
 This MRIO model assessed the impact the federally funded conservation easements had 
on rural counties in Colorado. However, we also need to consider the opportunity cost to federal 
spending. Instead of using those dollars to fund conservation easements, they could have funded 
another program. To better capture the effect of ACEP, I constructed counterfactuals, which 
attempt to capture the opportunity cost of the payments, or what might have been the situation 
had there been no injection of federal funds into private lands conservation in Colorado.  
Suppose that Colorado had decided that they would not participate in the ACEP program, 
ceteris paribus. I considered two counterfactual scenarios. First, Colorado’s voluntary boycott of 
the program allowed federal funds to be used in other government programs. Coloradoans still 
 
38 
paid the same federal income tax, so the analysis does not alter Coloradoans’ income or 
behaviors. I assume the federal money is used elsewhere outside of Colorado. This implies a 
negligible positive economic impact on Colorado relative to baseline, so I refer to this scenario 
as the zero counterfactual. Second, I considered a counterfactual scenario where voluntary 
nonparticipation in ACEP resulted in Coloradoans paying lower income tax. Rather than federal 
funds being used elsewhere in the government, Coloradoans would never have paid those taxes 
in the first place, so their income is increased relative to baseline. The federal government would 
not likely lower taxes based on voluntary nonparticipation, but this scenario represents the best 
plausible case for Coloradoans. These two counterfactual scenarios create upper and lower 
bounds on the MRIO results. The best Colorado could hope for is lower taxes and the worst is 
the government using those funds elsewhere. 
Lower federal income tax can be simulated in the MRIO model by increasing household 
income. I assumed the decrease in taxes would be the same magnitude as the amount of ACEP 
payments to Colorado and that the distribution of dollars is proportional to the amount of income 
tax paid. I estimated the economic impact of the tax decrease by injecting the ACEP payments to 
the corresponding households in rural and urban counties using IMPLAN.  
IMPLAN differentiates households by income category, so I differentiated households 
according to household income brackets. York (2018) of the Tax Foundation summarized 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) national federal income tax data from 2015. The US Census 
reported the number of Colorado households in household income brackets by county in 2015 
(United States Census Bureau, 2015). I reconciled the household income thresholds defined by 
the IRS with the US Census income brackets to estimate the total amount of federal income tax 
paid by each household income bracket in each county. I aggregated federal income tax by 
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income bracket based on the ERS rural and urban county classification. I calculated the 
percentage of total federal income tax paid by each bracket in both rural and urban counties and 
then allocated the $80.8 million ACEP payments to households.  
Household income bracket definitions differed slightly between data sources. US Census 
data definitions align with IMPLAN’s income brackets with one exception. IMPLAN defines an 
annual household income bracket for $50,000 to $75,000 and the following bracket as $75,000 to 
$100,000. The US Census provides data for $50,000 to $70,000 and $70,000 to $100,000. I 
assumed that households earning between $70,000 and $75,000 consume in a manner 
comparable to the $75,000 to $100,000 bracket defined in IMPLAN.  
The IRS reported taxes paid based on income percentiles (York, 2018). Using this data, I 
calculated the effective tax rate and created income tax brackets based on percentile thresholds. 
Table 4.8 reports the total income, federal taxes paid, and effective tax rate for each income 
bracket. I assumed that taxpayers in Colorado do not diverge from national averages in terms of 
effective tax rate by income bracket. 
Table 4.8. National Federal Income Tax Profile by Household Income Brackets, 2015 
 Annual Household Income Bracket (2015$) 

















$1,144,545 $2,000,338 $2,194,410 $1,144,771 $1,563,650 $2,094,906 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
4% 8% 11% 14% 19% 27% 




Median household income varies across urban and rural counties. I aggregated data for all 
rural and urban counties for comparison. Table 4.9 shows the detailed breakdown of the 
percentage of households in each income bracket for 2017 and the total percentage of households 
in rural and urban counties. Unsurprisingly, 87% of Colorado households live in urban counties 
according to US Census data. These results also show that 11% of Colorado households earn less 
than $15,000 annually and that the majority of these households live in urban counties. These 
details show the economic profile of rural and urban counties are not the same. This suggests that 
urban and rural counties will not have the same expenditure profiles when simulating a decrease 
in federal income tax. I estimated the total amount of federal income tax paid by each household 
category in rural and urban counties and apply this percentage to the total ACEP federal dollars 
spent on conservation easements in Colorado. Table 4.10 shows the resulting MRIO IMPLAN 
injections to households. 
Table 4.9. Household Income Profile for Rural and Urban Counties in Colorado, 2017 
Regio
n 
Percentage of Households in Annual Household Income Bracket  
(in Thousands of Dollars) 









Rural 1.63 2.17 1.36 1.33 2.48 1.53 1.29 0.39 0.37 12.55 
Urban 9.33 12.13 8.18 8.03 16.76 11.68 12.76 4.58 4.01 87.45 










Table 4.10. Counterfactual Household Injection 
Household Income Bracket 
(Annual, in Thousands of 
Dollars) 
Rural Injection Amount Urban Injection Amount 
<15 $43,955 $251,317 
15-30 $175,182 $979,831 
30-40 $171,399 $1,027,977 
40-50 $459,630 $2,770,245 
50-75 $1,189,230 $8,033,606 
75-100 $1,416,785 $10,846,220 
100-150 $2,260,336 $22,297,287 
150-200 $961,580 $11,211,120 
>200 $1,395,089 $15,328,558 
Total Injection Amount $8,073,185 $72,746,162 
 
I used the MRIO model to simulate the counterfactual by increasing rural and urban 
household income by the respective amount. I compared the economic impact of conservation 
easement payments on rural and urban counties to these counterfactual scenarios. These 
counterfactuals create bounds on the most likely alternative use to ACEP conservation easement 
money. The comparison between the impact of ACEP and the zero counterfactual creates an 
upper bound of the best approximation for the economic impact of ACEP. The comparison 
between the impact of ACEP and the impact of decreased federal income tax creates a lower 
bound on the best approximation for the economic impact of ACEP.  
Willingness to Pay for Conservation Easements 
 I conducted a meta-analysis of studies estimating WTP for agricultural lands and 
conservation easements in the United States to estimate WTP for conservation easements in 
Colorado. The conservation easements analyzed in this study are a special subset of agricultural 
land, so I combined both types of studies in the meta-analysis. Searches through Google Scholar, 
Academic Search Premier database, and citations from summary articles (Kashian & Skidmore, 
2002; Brander & Koetse, 2011) produced 26 potential studies that estimate willingness to pay for 
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agricultural land. I excluded estimates that could not be converted to annual WTP per acre per 
household. The final data consisted of 18 unique studies that contained 56 different WTP 
estimates. 
 Following Brander and Koetse (2011), I included the area of farmland/conservation 
easements in the study area, population density, median household income, and the year the 
survey was conducted. Additionally, I followed the wetland meta-analysis literature (Brouwer et 
al., 1999; Woodward & Wui, 2001; Brander et al., 2006; Brander et al., 2012) and controlled for 
the quality of the paper by including a dummy variable signifying that the estimate appeared in a 
peer-reviewed journal. Lastly, I controlled for the scale of the study estimate. As mentioned 
above, survey results in WTP per acre are conditional on the size of the study area. If 
respondents considered local agricultural land in their own community, they may have a higher 
WTP than if they considered less familiar state-wide agricultural land. I controlled for the scale 
of the study by specifying if the study was as the city, county, or state scale.  
 Meta-analysis combines data from the study results, the geographic study area, and the 
study itself. Studies provided varying levels of data about the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the study area. As such, median annual household income, population density per square mile, 
and acres of farmland/conservation easements were estimated with data from the US Census or 
the USDA Census of Agriculture. Annual data were not always available from these sources, in 
which case I used the nearest available data or a linear estimate. Often authors calculated an 
aggregate WTP for the agricultural land/conservation easements, and in doing so they estimated 
population with the most recent census data. In these cases, the source cited by the author was 
used in the calculations, but otherwise, I calculated a linear estimate for the missing data. 
Appendix C contains more details. 
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 Data often need transformation when estimating a meta-analysis econometric model.  All 
dollar amounts were converted to May 2018 dollars using Consumer Price Index data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019). Following Brander and Koetse 
(2011), I took the natural logarithm of income. Additionally, I transformed the WTP per acre per 
household per year, the area of conserved agricultural land, and population density by taking the 
natural logarithm to help with potential outliers. This gives the final model equation: ln(𝑊𝑇𝑃) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ln(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎) +  𝛽2 ∗ ln(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽3 ∗ ln(𝐻ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑐) + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 +  𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 +  𝛽6 ∗ 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 +  𝛽7 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝜖  
Where WTP is the willingness to pay in dollars per acre per year for agricultural land 
conservation; Area is the number of acres of conserved agricultural land in the study region; 
Popdensity is the population density per square mile in the study region; Hhinc is the median 
household annual income in the study region; Published is a dummy variable signifying if the 
study was published in a peer-reviewed journal; State and City are dummy variables showing if 
the study region was at the state or city scale; Year is the year the respondents were surveyed; 
and Samplesize is the sample size of the original study. Since the model includes two dummy 
variables for the city and state scale, the constant coefficient implicitly captures the county level 
scale and the estimates for 𝛽5 and 𝛽6 capture the differences in relation to county level studies. 
 Many meta-analyses suffer from homoskedastic data due to multiple observations from a 
single study. Brander and Koetse (2011) ran a weighted least squares model with the sample size 
of the study serving as the weight. Excluding interaction terms with dummy variables due to 
collinearity, I tested for homoskedasticity using White’s test and find that there is significant 
evidence that the data do suffer from heteroskedasticity (P=0.0007). Since meta-analyses 
frequently suffer from homoskedasticity with respect to the number of observations, I conducted 
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a Breusch-Pagan test with the sample size and sample size squared. The results of this test show 
that the data suffer from homoskedasticity with respect to the number of observations 
(P=0.0153).  
 I also tested for collinearity to ensure that the dummy variables provide enough unique 
information to be included in the model. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) numbers range 
from 2.18 for the state variable to 4.5 for the city variable. Table 4.11 lists the VIF numbers for 
all variables. I conclude that collinearity is not a problem with the data. 
Table 4.11. Variance Inflation Numbers 











I report the Ordinary Least Squares estimates since they are consistent in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity along with White’s correct standard errors. Since the estimates are consistent, 
I used the OLS model to predict the willingness to pay for conserved agricultural land in 
Colorado. Further, I report a WLS model which attempts to control for the heteroskedasticity 
using the number of observations as weights. This secondary model allows for more accurate 
conclusions regarding the driving factors of WTP for conservation easements. 
 After finding model estimates, I predicted the WTP for conservation easements in 
Colorado using the OLS model. According to COMAP, Colorado has 2,385,007 acres of land 
conserved (Colorado Natural Heritage Program and the Geospatial Centroid, 2018). According 
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to the 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, median household income in 
Colorado is $67,185.25 (in 2018$). According to the US Census’ 2017 Population Estimates, the 
population of Colorado in 2017 was 5,607,154. Given that Colorado has a total area of 104,094 
square miles, this translates into an estimated 53.87 people per square mile. I compared the 
estimated WTP to current payment amounts. This comparison shows whether Coloradoans are 
willing to pay more for conservation easements than is currently allocated.  
Benefit Transfer 
I identified 141 potentially relevant studies from the ENVALUE (a searchable 
environmental value database from the New South Wales government), Environmental 
Valuation Reference Inventory (EVRI), and The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
(TEEB) databases or other studies referenced for the analysis in Colorado. I eliminated any 
benefit transfer studies retaining only original valuation. I screened these studies for the specific 
ecosystems in Colorado, eliminating any coastal or saltwater ecosystems. Finally, I eliminated 
studies that did not provide sufficient detail to derive an annual dollar per acre or annual dollar 
per household per acre value. Thirty-five original valuation studies remained that could be used 
in the benefit transfer. Of these 35 valuation studies, 5 applied to forests, 13 to wetlands, 5 to 
open water, 9 to agriculture, 2 to grassland, and 1 to shrubland.  
I considered nine main land types, based on the National Land Cover Database (NLCD) 
classification system, that are found in Colorado: open water, woody wetland, emergent 
herbaceous wetland, deciduous forest, evergreen forest, mixed forest, agriculture, grassland, and 
shrub/scrub (Homer et al., 2012). I combined pasture and cropland cover types into an 
agriculture category and the three different forest types in NLCD into a single forest category 
due to data constraints. 
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Due to the lack of data for grassland and shrubland, I included 3 additional studies that 
did not conduct original research. Costanza et al. (1997) provided values for grassland, but they 
arrived at this value by a combination of original research and benefit transfer. Wilson (2014) 
provided values for pollination in both grassland and shrubland. I modified their estimates by 
taking the value of pollination in the United States and converting to a per acre value for 
grassland, forest, and shrubland. Finally, Batker et al. (2013) provided a value of air quality from 
shrubland taken from Costanza et al. (1997). I converted all values to dollars per acre per year 
adjusted to May 2018. Outlier values were eliminated since certain estimates from East Coast 
studies do not apply to Colorado. 
I identified values for the ecosystem services listed in Table 4.12, where an “X” signifies 
that the literature provided a value for that ecosystem service. I classified ecosystem service 
types from de Groot et al. (2002) into the four Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2004) 
categories which appear in Table 4.5. I report ecosystem service values for each land cover type 
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Table 4.13. Annual Ecosystem Service Values from the Literature, 2018$ per Acre 
Ecosystem Service Min Value Max Value Study 
Open Water Water Supply 147.35 147.35 Roberts & Leitch (1997) 
 Waste Treatment 350.89 350.89 Bouwes & Schneider 
(1979) 
 Habitat Value 32.92 32.92 Roberts & Leitch (1997) 
  327.34 327.34 Gupta & Foster (1975) 
TOTAL   531.16 825.59  
     
Forest Water Supply 10.63 60.58 Campbell & Tilley 
(2014) 




29.29 30.71 Lewis, et al. (1996) 
 Carbon 1822.00 1822.00 InVEST 
 Disturbance 
Moderation 




29.76 46.76 Campbell & Tilley 
(2014) 
 Nutrient Cycling 6.38 14.88 Campbell & Tilley 
(2014) 
 Pollination 0.05 0.33 Campbell & Tilley 
(2014) 
 Biological Control 13.32 13.32 Pimentel, et al. (1995) 




0.12 0.15 Hand, et al. (2008) 
TOTAL   1956.18 2198.08  
     
Shrub/Scrub Air Quality 6.94 8.76 Batker, et al. (2013) 
 Carbon 356.00 356.00 InVEST  
 Pollination 5.72 26.32 Wilson (2014) 
 Genetic Diversity 80.26 115.76 Scott, et al. (1998) 
 Recreation 9.26 115.76 Scott, et al. (1998) 
TOTAL   458.19 622.60  
Ecosystem Service Min Value Max Value Study 






112.91 112.91 Costanza, et al. (1997) 
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 Carbon 276.00 276.00 InVEST  
 Erosion 
Prevention 
63.44 63.44 Pimentel, et al. (1995) 
 Pollination 5.72 26.32 Wilson (2014) 
TOTAL   458.07 478.66  
     
Agriculture Carbon 146.00 146.00 InVEST 
 Erosion 
Prevention 
23.23 23.23 Hansen (2007) 
 Pollination 5.72 26.32 Wilson (2014) 
 Genetic Diversity 29.66 29.66 Hansen (2007) 
 Recreation 47.33 47.33 Knoche & Lupi (2007) 
TOTAL   251.94 272.54  
     
Woody 
Wetlands 
Water Supply 147.35 147.35 Roberts & Leitch (1997) 
 Carbon 295.00 295.00 InVEST 
 Disturbance 
Moderation 
7.34 7.34 Watson, et al. (2016) 
  46.75 65.75 Zavaleta (2000) 
  374.11 374.11 Gupta & Foster (1975) 
  689.71 689.71 Roberts & Leitch (1997) 
 Erosion 
Prevention 
72.49 72.49 Rein (1999) 
 Biological Control 662.27 686.50 Jenkins, et al. (2010)  
 Genetic Diversity 32.92 32.92 Roberts & Leitch (1997) 
  327.34 327.34 Gupta & Foster (1975) 
TOTAL   1217.36 2218.39  




Water Supply 147.35 147.35 Roberts & Leitch (1997) 
 Carbon 295.00 295.00 InVEST 
 Disturbance 
Moderation 
4.53 11.88 Hovde & Leitch (1994) 
  46.75 65.75 Zavaleta (2000) 
  374.11 374.11 Gupta & Foster (1975) 





72.49 72.49 Rein (1999) 
 Nutrient Cycling 0.29 1.10 Hovde & Leitch (1994) 
 Biological Control 662.27 686.50 Jenkins, et al. (2010)  
 Genetic Diversity 2.43 14.31 Hovde & Leitch (1994) 
  32.92 32.92 Roberts & Leitch (1997) 
  327.34 327.34 Gupta & Foster (1975) 
 Esthetic 
Information 
0.10 0.56 Hovde & Leitch (1994) 
TOTAL   1184.45 2220.05  
 
 Rather than the valuation literature, I used Integrating Valuation of Ecosystem Services 
and Tradeoffs (InVEST), a benefit transfer tool from the Natural Capital Project, to estimate 
carbon storage and sequestration values. I assumed that carbon, as a global public good, should 
have the same value worldwide. InVEST has been used recently in the literature to facilitate 
ecosystem service studies in a variety of ways (Isely, et al., 2010; Choi & Lee, 2018; Moreira, et 
al., 2018). I only utilized InVEST’s ability to estimate carbon storage and sequestration amounts 
based on land cover types and then apply a price of carbon. In their meta-analysis of social cost 
of carbon estimates, Tol (2008) compared their estimated median of $20 per tonne of carbon 
using 3% discount rate to the European Union’s cost of carbon permits at $160 per tonne of 
carbon. Using 3% discount rates, Nordhaus (2017) found a social cost of carbon to be $87 per 
tonne compared to the US Interagency Working Group’s estimates of an average of $45 per 
tonne. I used a conservative estimate of $20 per tonne to estimate carbon sequestration values. 
Applying this tool to the conserved lands in Colorado, I derived estimates for metric tons (1 
tonne = 2200 lbs.) of carbon stored and sequestered for an acre of each land cover type. I 
estimated carbon storage and sequestration ecosystem service value applying the conservative 
estimate of $20 per metric ton for carbon. 
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As carbon reporting and offsetting more often becomes a mandatory component of 
climate adaptation and mitigation plans, the market price of carbon will rise, as has been 
observed in the European Union in 2018 (Twidale, 2018). To ignore these values would be to 
discount substantially important ecological values. However, due to the magnitude of these 
carbon sequestration and storage values, I compare the minimum and maximum values with and 
without carbon (Table 4.14). I calculated the minimum and maximum values by summing the 
ecosystem service values, approaching the total public value of the ecosystem. Following 
Costanza et al. (1997, 2014), I assumed that ecosystem services are non-rival and that no 
ecosystem services is an intermediate product to another final product ecosystem services. The 
assumption that an ecosystem can provide one service independent of all others allows summing 
across all relevant ecosystem services to provide a final estimate. As mentioned before, experts 
debate this assumption and it is an area of improvement for benefit transfer analyses (e.g., 
Barbier et al., 2008). 
Table 4.14 illustrates not all land parcels provide the same public benefits, with 
maximum annual per acre benefits ranging from $2,220 dollars for emergent herbaceous 
wetlands to $273 for agricultural land. If the goal is to maximize the public benefits from 
taxpayer investments in conservation easements, the land type of the conserved land is important 








Table 4.14. Annual Ecosystem Service Value Estimates with and without InVEST Carbon 









Forest 1,956 2,198 134 376 
Emergent Herbaceous Wetland 1,184 2,220 889 1,925 
Wooded Wetland 1,217 2,218 922 1,923 
Open Water 531 826 531 826 
Agriculture 252 273 106 127 
Grassland 458 479 458 479 
Scrub/Shrub 458 623 102 267 
 
To better understand the public benefits provided by conservation easements in Colorado, 
I explore the land types that are currently under easement in Colorado. Colorado Natural 
Heritage Program has mapped all conserved lands in Colorado, made accessible through the 
Colorado Ownership, Management and Protection (COMaP) service (Colorado Natural Heritage 
Program and the Geospatial Centroid, 2018). COMaP provides data on many kinds of conserved 
lands, so I filtered out public and non-conservation easement lands. Using COMaP, I overlaid 
land cover data from the Multi-Resolution Land Characteristics Consortium (MRLC, 2019). The 
National Land Cover Database (NLCD) maps land covers for the entire United States based on 
20 different categories. I excluded four categories found only in Alaska and four developed land 
categories. I found the acreage of each land cover type, applied the estimated ecological benefits 
from the survey of the literature, and estimated the value of benefits provided by these conserved 
lands. 
The estimate of ecosystem service values gives insight into the public value of 
conservation easements in Colorado. These benefits come at a cost to or an investment by 





ACEP Payment Methods 
 Lastly, I compare the various value estimates for ACEP conserved agricultural land in 
Colorado. I compare actual cost, estimated environmental benefits, the rental value of the land, 
proposed Geographic Area Rate Cap values, and my own calculated value based on rental value 
and estimated benefits. Actual conservation easement payments are included in the available 
data, and estimated environmental benefits come from the previous section using benefit transfer 
methods. I expand the analysis to include rental value, previously suggested Colorado GARC 
values, and my own proposed compensation calculation. 
The National Agricultural Statistics Service provides rental data for agricultural parcels. 
They report county level, as well as Agricultural District, rental rates for irrigated and non-
irrigated cropland and pastures annually from 2009 to 2017 except for 2015. I converted these 
dollar per acre values to 2018 dollars. In cases where counties are too small to protect individual 
privacy, rental rates are aggregated with other counties. I estimated missing data by using the 
average rental rate for the Agricultural District when possible or by averaging the previous and 
following year that data are available. To find the rental value of conservation easement lands, I 
applied the rental rates to conservation easements with available land use profiles. I aggregated 
survey data and additional conservation easement data in Southeast Colorado from 2009 to 2017. 
Land use of conservation easements is estimated from survey responses of without-easement 
lands and is reported for Southeast Colorado easements. I categorized these land uses into 
irrigated cropland, non-irrigated cropland, and pastureland and apply the correct annual rental 
rate. I converted the annual rental rate to a value in perpetuity. I followed the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s recommendation of using a 3%, 5%, or 7% interest rate (Environmental 
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Protection Agency, 2010). I used a 5% discount rate throughout the analysis. Converting annual 
rental amounts gives the rental value estimates for conserved agricultural land. 
According to the National Agricultural Statistics Service, in 2017 the rental value for 
irrigated cropland ranged from $26.68 to $217.59 per acre (in 2018$). Taking an unweighted 
average, meaning each county where data are available contributes equally regardless of how 
many acres of land were rented, the average rental value for irrigated cropland in Colorado was 
$105.71 per acre. Non-irrigated cropland ranged from $10.78 to $43.11 per acre with an 
unweighted mean of $24.46. Pasture land ranged from $1.74 to $17.45 per acre with an 
unweighted mean of $6.17. Supply, demand, productivity, and transportation distances cause 
these wide ranges in rental rates. Not all irrigated cropland – let alone agricultural land generally 
– in Colorado is the same.  
At the 2012 NRCS Colorado State Technical Committee Meeting, Dawn Jackson 
proposed GARC values for certain regions in Colorado. As discussed, GARC values are a 
mixture of compensating landowners for the public value of their property and limiting 
enrollment for ACEP budgetary constraints. Agricultural GARC values are seldom used due to 
large variations in land values. Even across the state of Colorado agricultural land changes 
dramatically, from the fruit orchards of the western slopes to the ranches of the eastern plains. In 
addition, Colorado is reluctant to use agricultural GARC values due to concerns about fraudulent 
transactions in the conservation easement system (Ramsey, 2018). With these caveats in mind, I 
calculated the proposed GARC values for illustration and comparison. 
In order to apply GARC and rental rate values, I classified the aggregated data of both 
survey results and additional conservation easements into the three rental rate categories: 
irrigated cropland, non-irrigated cropland, and pasture. Table 4.15 shows what land uses were 
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mapped to which rental categories. The conservation easement data consist of 18,369 acres of 
irrigated cropland, 750 acres of non-irrigated cropland, and 76,692 acres of pasture. 
Table 4.15. Crosswalk Between Land Uses and Rental Category 
Land Use Rental Category 
Flood Irrigated Irrigated Cropland 
Mechanized Irrigated Irrigated Cropland 
Irrigated Cropland Irrigated Cropland 
Fallow Non-irrigated Cropland 
Fruit Production Non-irrigated Cropland 
Idle Non-irrigated Cropland 
Cropland Non-irrigated Cropland 
Livestock Grazing Pasture 
Meadows Pasture 
Irrigated Meadow Pasture 
Mountain Meadows Pasture 
Native Range Pasture 
Native Grass Pasture 
Range Pasture 
Mountain Native Range Pasture 
 
Lastly, I calculated a proposed estimate of the value of conservation easements in 
Colorado. I used previously estimated agricultural rental rate values from the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service and actual conservation easement payment amounts. Actual 
conservation easement payments are to defray a percentage of the estimated current and future 
value given up by the landowner. Agricultural rental rates are directly related to the productivity 
of the land in agriculture. If development potential drives the fair market value of land, then 
value in agricultural production and the opportunity cost for development will diverge. From the 
sample data, I calculated the proportion of opportunity cost (Opportunity) to rental value 
(Rental). This method assumes that the proportion of opportunity cost to agricultural rental rate 
will remain constant for every parcel of agricultural land in Colorado, which likely is not the 
case. I estimated the opportunity cost of a hypothetical parcel of land using this proportion and 
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multiply it by 0.75 to reflect a typical GARC percentage. Next, I added a tenth of the estimated 
environmental benefits to encourage land stewardship for public values of private lands. I 
conducted additional robustness checks on the coefficients in front of the estimated opportunity 
cost and environmental values. This method attempts to replace some of the compensation based 
on the developmental value of the land with the environmental benefits the land provides. This 
gives the following equation:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 = 0.75 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 ∗ (𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 ) + 0.1 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 
The counterfactual of enrolling land into conservation easements varies with the location, but I 
do not claim that the alternative land use would not provide any environmental benefits. As such, 
By means of illustration, I propose compensating landowners one-tenth of the estimated 
environmental benefits they provide. Additional data would improve the precision of this 
estimate, but the proposal at least compensates landowners for the benefits they provide in 
addition to the lost value of their land due to easement restrictions. This proposed 









 Survey responses show that the majority of federal conservation easement compensation 
was invested in debt payments (52.1%), followed by saving (16.6%), and re-investment in 
production agriculture (16.1%) (Figure 5.1). Debt repayment is the most frequently reported 
investment category, with 63.6% of easement holders reporting using some portion of their 
easement payment on debt reduction. Some 52.3% of respondents indicated that they reinvested 
at least some of their easement compensation back into their agricultural operation, and 36.4% 
indicated that they put some of the money into savings. The average response and standard 
deviation are also reported in Table 5.1. 
 






Table 5.1. Reported Agricultural Conservation Easement Payment Use 














53.49 15.11 27.0 17.6 
Diversification 6.98 1.1 6.3 1.5 
Land Purchase/Real 
estate 
27.91 13.22 24.6 10.8 
Savings 37.21 17.32 32.7 19.9 
Debt 58.14 51.74 40.1 34.7 
Non-Business related 
goods 
4.65 0.09 1.8 0.4 
Education 4.65 0.21 3.1 0.7 
Other/Charity 6.98 1.2 24.1 14.4 
 
 The published literature notes a wide range of investment strategies for conservation 
easement payments, and the results from this survey are in line with results from previous 
literature. Duke & Ilvento (2004) found that 54.2% of easement owners reported putting some 
proportion toward savings and Clark (2010) found that in Ohio 52% of easement payment went 
toward investment and savings. In contrast, Lynch (2007) found that only 28% of respondents 
put money toward savings. My survey results follow Duke & Ilvento (2004) and Clark (2010) 
more closely with 47.7% of easement owners surveyed putting some proportion of their 
easement payment toward savings.  
The literature also reports a range of results related to the proportion of respondents using 
the payments to pay down debt. Clark (2010) found 35% of easement payment dollars went to 
debt repayment while Lynch (2007) found this in 35% of respondents. Esseks (2006) reported 
55% of respondents put some of their payment toward debt relief. Some 63.3% of the survey 
respondents indicated that 52.1% of the funds went toward debt repayment, indicating that the 
respondents allocated a greater proportion of their easement payment towards debt repayment 
than past studies have shown. 
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 In addition to basic expenditure patterns, the survey provided insight into conservation 
easement practices, demographics, and additional impacts above simple expenditures. In 
Colorado, the average federal conservation easement payment was $540,932, with an average of 
1,357 acres enrolled or $399 per acre. The average non-federal match was $1,070,082, indicating 
federal funds are leveraged at 2:1 in Colorado, ignoring potential state and federal tax credit 
program participation. The majority of agricultural conservation easements in the state (58) were 
administered through the FRPP, while 8 were administered through ACEP/ALE, and 2 through 
GRP.  
The survey results also show 41.9% of federal conservation easement participants in 
Colorado changed their agricultural practices in some way due to the easement payment. Some 
commonly reported changes include improved irrigation (32.5%), increased acreage (14%), and 
changes in crop mix and rotation (2.3%). Perhaps in part due to these changes in practices, 6.8% 
of survey respondents indicated an improvement in their yields attributable to participation in the 
federal program; however, no one reported a decrease in yields. The survey found 11.4% of 
respondents indicated that they added outdoor recreation opportunities to their operations, for a 
total reported increase of 255 recreation days. This strategy has the potential to diversify farm 
incomes and support rural communities in low yield years. 
Other survey results illustrate some of the non-market benefits that could not be captured 
in the Input-Output analysis. One respondent indicated that the easement money helped them get 
through difficult years of drought. Another respondent mentioned more elk grazing on their 
property. Another respondent revitalized an older orchard with easement money, which should 
create economic returns for decades. Agricultural conservation easement payments allowed 
others to build vacation rental units, invest in river projects to provide fishing recreation, assist in 
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a company sale, and lease federal land for grazing. These reported effects of ACEP were not 
captured in the following economic impact results. 
Economic Impact 
 First, I present the economic impact of the conservation program on the state of 
Colorado, focusing on the sectors driving economic activity. Next, I used an MRIO model in 
IMPLAN to separate impacts into urban and rural counties. I also report spillover coefficients for 
the primary sectors in the MRIO model. Finally, I compare the results to two counterfactual 
analyses: the zero counterfactual and a decrease in federal income tax for Coloradoans.  
Single Region IMPLAN Analysis 
I analyzed federal conservation easement payments in Colorado from 2009 to 2017, 
which accounted for a total of $36,551,003 (in 2018 dollars) in payments to Colorado 
agricultural landowners (Table 5.2). I used IMPLAN to understand how these payments were 
spent in Colorado’s economy and impacted the state directly and indirectly. The expenditure 
profiles outlined in Table 5.2 shows how the easement payment dollars were spent within the 
Colorado economy. Figure 5.2 illustrates the distribution of easement dollars over the 9-year 
period and the source of easement funding. All the Colorado easement payments were from 
FRPP, until 2012 when GRP first became part of the easement portfolio (Figure 5.2). ACEP 
succeeded the FRPP and GRP programs in 2014. Figure 5.2 also illustrates that easement 
payments are not constant from year-to-year with spikes in Colorado easement payment receipts 








Figure 5.2. Sample Federal Agricultural Conservation Easement Payments to Colorado, 2009-18 
 
Table 5.2 shows Colorado federal easement payments by year. The first column shows 
that the total Colorado federal easement payments during the period was $33,825,370. Converted 
to 2018 dollars, the total real federal easement value is $36,551,003.  Some $27,375,997 of these 
easement dollars came from the FRPP program, $8,427,426 from the ACEP program and 
$747,579 from the GRP program. 















2009 $1,047,084 $1,227,918 $1,227,918 $0 $0 
2010 $1,809,649 $2,106,170 $2,106,170 $0 $0 
2011 $4,671,087 $5,366,388 $5,366,388 $0 $0 
2012 $3,481,337 $3,834,569 $3,518,980 $315,589 $0 
2013 $2,253,616 $2,447,872 $2,015,881 $431,990 $0 
2014 $1,823,525 $1,967,924 $1,967,924 $0 $0 
2015 $8,803,452 $9,353,192 $8,922,562 $0 $430,630 
2016 $1,449,120 $1,519,044 $628,952 $0 $890,092 
2017 $5,924,000 $6,097,810 $838,602 $0 $5,259,207 
2018 $2,562,500 $2,630,117 $782,620 $0 $1,847,497 
TOTAL $33,825,370 $36,551,003 $27,375,997 $747,579 $8,427,426 
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Table 5.3. Single Region Economic Impacts of Federal Conservation Easement Payments 
on Colorado, 2018$ 
Impact Type Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Direct Effect 497 $23,914,000 $35,989,000 $80,249,000* 
Indirect Effect 342 $19,353,000 $28,749,000 $55,595,000 
Induced Effect 283 $13,089,000 $23,089,000 $40,217,000 
Total Effect 1122 $56,356,000 $87,827,000 $176,061,000 
*Note that this value is slightly lower than the total easement payments due to margining 
in the retail sectors 
 
Table 5.3 shows the summary results from the IMPLAN analysis. The analysis shows 
that $80.8 million in federal agricultural conservation easement program spending created over 
$176 million dollars in new economic activity to the state of Colorado over the past nine years 
(2009 – 2017). The $176 million in new economic activity created 1,122 new jobs and $88 
million dollars in value-added in Colorado over the period. 
The generated economic activity is associated with a Colorado total output multiplier of 
2.18 for financial injections from federal agricultural conservation easements. This means that 
for every dollar of federal conservation easement payments in the state, $2.18 dollars of direct, 
indirect and induced economic activity is generated in Colorado. This multiplier is larger than 
typically expected due to the large economic multipliers associated with the banking sector. 
Respondents spent over $55.8 million dollars in the form of payment of debt and contributions to 
savings which stimulated the banking sector.  
Table 5.4 illustrates in more granular detail the sectors of the Colorado economy that are 
most affected by the $80.8 million in federal conservation easement payments. Payments 
affected the banking sector most, which is unsurprising as the survey found that paying down 
debt and investing in saving accounted for 71% of all conservation easement expenditures. Other 
sectors associated with direct spending, such as agricultural reinvestment and retail sectors, also 
rank in the top ten. Due to the multiplier effects of the easement payment spending, many of the 
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sectors in the top ten are not areas where direct payment expenditures occurred. The industrial 
sectors that experience relatively large effects all have linkages to the banking sector and include 
wholesale trade, management of companies and data processing.  
Table 5.4. Top Ten Colorado Industries Affected by Agricultural Conservation Easement 
Compensation 
 Description Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Banking Sector* 398 $24,776,000 $31,081,000 $70,863,000 
Real Estate* 101 $1,856,000 $12,637,000 $18,594,000 
Reinvest in Agriculture* 115 $2,822,000 $3,430,000 $14,407,000 
Owner-occupied dwellings 0 $0 $3,056,000 $4,712,000 
Retail* 56 $1,797,000 $2,912,000 $3,996,000 
Insurance agencies, 
brokerages, and related 
activities 
22 $1,267,000 $1,584,000 $3,640,000 
Wholesale trade 15 $1,286,000 $2,210,000 $3,404,000 
Management of companies 
and enterprises 
12 $1,616,000 $1,917,000 $3,081,000 
Insurance carriers 6 $587,000 $1,096,000 $2,317,000 
Data processing, hosting, 
and related services 
8 $813,000 $858,000 $2,205,000 
*custom aggregated sector, for details on the industries in these sectors refer to Table 5.5 
 
The previous aggregation of IMPLAN sectors makes implicit assumptions about how 
money is spent within those aggregated sectors. I shocked each aggregated sector in isolation and 
attempted to replicate the results by shocking just one IMPLAN sector. These results show 
which sectors are driving the results and allows for evaluation. For example, the custom sector 
“Reinvest in Agriculture” might give results driven by the IMPLAN sector “Fruit farming.” 
Although the data include fruit farming operations, it would be unreasonable to presume that 
most of the money spent on investing in agriculture would be invested in fruit farming. Table 5.5 
shows the single IMPLAN sectors that best replicate the aggregated sectors according to total 
output and total employment along with the percentage of error. Both employment and output 
criteria result in single sectors that seem reasonable given the specific survey data.  
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Table 5.5. IMPLAN Sectors Which Replicate Aggregated Sectors 
Aggregated 
Sector 
Sector with Smallest 
Total Output Error 





















giving and social 
advocacy 
organizations 
-10.24 Grantmaking, giving 
and social advocacy 
organizations 
-57.02 
Education Other educational 
services 








-0.57 Other amusement and 
recreation industries 
-5.00 
Retail Retail- Health and 
personal care stores 










Multi-Region IMPLAN Analysis 
I hope to isolate the economic impact on rural counties in Colorado that cannot be seen 
from the state level analysis. Using the ERS definition of metro and non-metro counties I 
categorized each county into urban and rural, respectively. Due to limitations with IMPLAN, the 
multi-region model cannot use custom aggregated sectors in the analysis. From the results in 
Table 5.5, I used representative sectors to conduct the analysis. The representative sectors change 
when using different criteria of employment or total output. I chose to focus the analysis on total 
output and used representative sectors based on that criterion. In the results, I report the changes 
in employment but caution the reader that I do not expect these numbers to map directly to the 
state level impact analysis.  
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I allocated conservation easement payments to urban and rural counties based on the 
survey data assuming expenditures occurred in the same county as the conservation easement. 
The survey shows 20% of conservation easement payment dollars went to landowners in urban 
counties. Additionally, 40% of the surveyed conservation easements and 32.3% of conserved 
acres are in urban counties. I used the expenditure profiles listed in Table 5.1 which were derived 
from the survey results to allocate money to economic sectors. Table 5.6 shows the amounts 
allocated to specific sectors in the urban and rural regions. The proportion allocated to each 
sector is the same for both urban and rural, but the total amount reflecting the differences in total 
conservation easement compensation to urban and rural counties.  
Table 5.6. MRIO Direct Expenditures 
Sector Rural Direct Expenditure Urban Direct Expenditure 
Reinvest in Agriculture $9,775,439.90 $2,439,103.94 
Real Estate $8,548,478.02 $2,132,960.42 
Banking Sector $44,666,522.00 $11,144,898.93 
Charity $158,834.50 $39,631.35 
Education $137,773.14 $34,376.25 
Nonfarm Enterprise $713,493.11 $178,026.14 
Retail $680,111.98 $169,697.10 
Total $64,680,652.65 $16,138,694.13 
 
I calculated spillover coefficients from urban counties to rural counties and from rural 
counties to urban counties (Table 5.7). The Rural spillover coefficients to the urban region range 
from 0.38 for Charity to 0.00 for Reinvest in Agriculture. The Urban spillover coefficients vary 
from 0.23 for Reinvest in Agriculture to 0.02 for Nonfarm Enterprises, Real Estate, and 
Education. These calculated results match similar studies in the literature (Hamilton et al., 1991; 
Hughes & Litz, 1996). Agricultural sectors have greater spillover from urban regions to rural 




Table 5.7. Spillover Coefficients 
Sector To Urban Counties To Rural Counties 
Reinvest in Agriculture 0.00 0.23 
Real Estate 0.22 0.02 
Banking Sector 0.29 0.03 
Charity 0.38 0.04 
Education 0.25 0.02 
Nonfarm Enterprises 0.24 0.02 
Retail 0.27 0.04 
 
First, I ran the analysis on the Rural model and examine the spillover effect into urban 
counties. Scaling the survey results to the entire $80.8 million federal dollars received as 
payment for conservation easements, I injected $64,680,653 into the Rural model (Table 5.6). 
This $64.7 million injection resulted in an economic impact of $111.8 million dollars within 
rural counties and $19 million dollars of impact in urban counties (Tables 5.8 and 5.9).  
Table 5.8. Rural Model Economic Impact on Rural Counties, 2018$ 
Impact Type Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Direct Effect 396 $21,292,000 $27,960,000 $64,219,000* 
Indirect Effect 238 $8,862,000 $13,807,000 $30,233,000 
Induced Effect 137 $4,976,000 $9,714,000 $17,362,000 
Total Effect 771 $35,130,000 $51,481,000 $111,814,000 
*Note that this value is slightly lower than the total easement payments due to margining 
in the retail sectors 
 
Table 5.9. Rural Model Economic Impact on Urban Counties, 2018$ 
Impact Type Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Direct Effect* $0 $0 $0 $0 
Indirect Effect $4,813,000 $6,705,000 $12,069,000 $4,813,000 
Induced Effect $2,367,000 $3,965,000 $6,949,000 $2,367,000 
Total Effect $7,180,000 $10,670,000 $19,018,000 $7,180,000 
*Note that the Direct Effect will always be 0 for periphery regions 
 
Next, I ran the analysis on the Urban model, with interest in the spillover effect into rural 
counties. Using the same methodology as the Rural model, I injected $16,138,694 into the Urban 
model (Table 5.6). This $16.1 million generated an economic impact of $34.8 million dollars 
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within urban counties and $272 thousand dollars of impact in rural counties (Tables 5.10 and 
5.11).  
Table 5.10. Urban Model Economic Impact on Urban Counties, 2018$ 
Impact Type Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Direct Effect 90 $6,322,000 $7,952,000 $16,023,000* 
Indirect Effect 65 $3,515,000 $5,215,000 $9,564,000 
Induced Effect 64 $3,030,000 $5,333,000 $9,232,000 
Total Effect 219 $12,867,000 $18,500,000 $34,820,000 
*Note that this value is slightly lower than the total easement payments due to 
margining in the retail sectors 
 
Table 5.11. Urban Model Economic Impact on Rural Counties, 2018$ 
Impact Type Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Direct Effect* 0 $0 $0 $0 
Indirect Effect 1 $45,000 $72,000 $180,000 
Induced Effect 1 $23,000 $44,000 $93,000 
Total Effect 2 $68,000 $116,000 $272,000 
*Note that the Direct Effect will always be 0 for periphery regions 
 
Since I disaggregated the sectors, I compare the results with the original single region 
analysis. The total impact of rural counties is $112.1 million, and the urban impact is $53.8 
million. The total impact on the Colorado economy with MRIO modeling is then $166 million 
compared to the original result of $176 million. This 5.7% discrepancy could be caused by 
mapping injections to different representative sectors. Alternatively, the original analysis could 
have overstated the impact due to aggregating injections to both urban and rural counties. In 
other words, the MRIO analysis correctly attributes injections to rural counties with smaller 
economic multipliers whereas the original analysis overestimates how much money is injected 
into urban areas with larger multipliers. I cannot definitively identify the source of the 
discrepancy. However, a 5.7% difference in results does not indicate any serious problems with 
the MRIO modeling procedure. 
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In both the Rural and Urban models, the most affected industries in the primary region 
look almost identical. The top three industries include banking, real estate, and grain farming. 
Since these three sectors received a portion of the direct impact of spending, it comes as no 
surprise that they appear in the most affected. The rest of the top ten industries impacted include 
industries closely tied to banking (5.12 and 5.13). These results mirror the previous single region 
results.  
The most affected industries in the peripheral regions in these models do not share many 
similarities. In the Rural model, the top affected industries in the peripheral region primarily 
consist of banking or real estate related industries. Interestingly, other support sectors such as Air 
Transportation and Advertising show up as well. In the Urban model, the top affected industries 
in the peripheral region still include some banking and real estate-related sectors. In contrast to 
the previous results, four of the top ten industries are agricultural related and three of the top ten 
industries are energy related. These linkages show that urban regions demand more energy and 
agricultural related goods from rural regions. In contrast, rural regions demand more specialized 











Table 5.12. Top Ten Industries Affected in Primary Region of Rural Model 
 Description Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Banking Sector 305 $19,057,000 $20,413,000 $45,487,000 
Real Estate 76 $1,407,000 $8,896,000 $13,361,000 
Reinvest in Agriculture 27 $1,023,000 $1,176,000 $10,092,000 
Insurance agencies, 
brokerages, and related 
activities 
54 $2,249,000 $2,741,000 $7,762,000 
Monetary authorities and 
depository credit 
intermediation 
13 $845,000 $1,598,000 $2,830,000 
Owner-occupied dwellings 0 $0 $1,825,000 $2,813,000 
Other financial investment 
activities 
15 $211,000 $253,000 $2,102,000 
Support activities for 
agriculture and forestry 
24 $742,000 $768,000 $1,064,000 
Limited-service restaurants 11 $258,000 $641,000 $1,054,000 
Wholesale trade 6 $311,000 $560,000 $1,031,000 
 
Table 5.13. Top Ten Industries Affected in Primary Region of Urban Model 
 Description Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Banking Sector 65 $6,050,000 $6,334,000 $11,728,000 
Real Estate 20 $372,000 $2,569,000 $3,766,000 
Reinvest in Agriculture 12 $251,000 $288,000 $2,470,000 
Insurance agencies, 
brokerages, and related 
activities 
8 $471,000 $590,000 $1,337,000 
Owner-occupied dwellings 0 $0 $701,000 $1,081,000 
Other financial investment 
activities 
5 $175,000 $206,000 $807,000 
Wholesale trade 3 $284,000 $486,000 $741,000 
Monetary authorities and 
depository credit 
intermediation 
3 $210,000 $391,000 $619,000 
Insurance carriers 2 $156,000 $291,000 $615,000 
Management of companies 
and enterprises 






Table 5.14. Top Ten Industries Affected in Periphery Region of Rural Model (Spillover 
to Urban) 
 Description Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Banking Sector 305 $19,057,000 $20,413,000 $45,487,000 




5 $748,000 $887,000 $1,398,000 
Banking Sector 7 $690,000 $723,000 $1,339,000 
Other financial 
investment activities 
7 $264,000 $311,000 $1,219,000 




1 $127,000 $312,000 $614,000 
Owner-occupied 
dwellings 
0 $0 $391,000 $603,000 
Advertising, public 
relations, and related 
services 
2 $124,000 $288,000 $453,000 
Air transportation 1 $101,000 $208,000 $413,000 
 
Table 5.15. Top Ten Industries Affected in Periphery Region of Urban Model (Spillover 
to Rural) 
 Description Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Reinvest in Agriculture 0 $3,000 $4,000 $30,000 
Insurance agencies, 
brokerages, and related 
activities 
0 $7,000 $9,000 $24,000 
Real Estate 0 $2,000 $16,000 $24,000 
Wireless telecommunications 
carriers (except satellite) 
0 $0 $4,000 $12,000 
Support activities for 
agriculture and forestry 
0 $8,000 $8,000 $12,000 
Beef cattle ranching and 
farming, including feedlots 
and dual-purpose ranching 
and farming 
0 $1,000 $2,000 $10,000 
Electric power generation - 
Fossil fuel 
0 $1,000 $3,000 $9,000 
Electric power generation - 
Wind 
0 $0 $6,000 $7,000 
All other crop farming 0 $3,000 $3,000 $7,000 
Extraction of natural gas and 
crude petroleum 




The multi-region analysis shows that 67.5% of the total economic impact from federal 
conservation easement dollars occurred in rural counties. Although 80% of the direct payments 
go to rural counties, concentration of businesses in urban areas mean that spending more often 
occurs in these places – even by rural inhabitants. In other words, linkages are stronger from 
rural-to-urban than urban-to-rural and can be seen in the spillover coefficients that explicitly 
show spillover effects to urban counties are stronger than to rural counties with the one exception 
of grain farming. Although these results uncover more of the story than a single region analysis, 
to tell the whole story the analysis must include a counterfactual use of conservation easement 
monies. 
Counterfactual IMPLAN Analysis 
 In place of ACEP funding conservation easements in Colorado I considered reducing 
federal income tax. I allocated ACEP dollars by estimating the proportion of federal income tax 
paid by each household bracket in rural and urban counties. I estimated the economic impact of 
this tax decrease using the MRIO model. This creates a lower bound on the actual economic 
impact of ACEP funding in Colorado. 
The Rural model counterfactual analysis shows that lowering federal income tax resulted 
in a total economic impact of $5.3 million in rural counties and $0.7 million spillover to urban 
counties. In the Urban model, I estimated an economic impact in urban counties of $78.4 million 
and spillover to rural counties of $0.6 million. This results in a total impact in rural counties of 
$5.8 million and an impact of $79.1 million in urban counties (Table 5.16). In the counterfactual 
model, the majority of the money went to urban households as they pay a higher percentage of 
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total federal income tax. The results reflect this with 93% of the total economic impact occurring 
in urban counties.  
Table 5.16. Counterfactual Summary Results 
Model and Region Employment Labor Income Total Value Added Output 
Rural Primary 42 $1,511,000 $2,954,000 $5,276,000 
Rural Periphery 4 $270,000 $414,000 $743,000 
Urban Primary 542 $25,720,000 $45,275,000 $78,392,000 
Urban Periphery 3 $132,000 $251,000 $567,000 
Total Impact on Rural 45 $1,643,000 $3,205,000 $5,843,000 
Total Impact on Urban 547 $25,990,000 $45,689,000 $79,135,000 
 
 Tables 5.17 – 5.20 break down the industries most affected in both the primary and 
periphery regions of the Rural and Urban models. The most affected industries in the primary 
regions share many similarities. Owner-occupied dwellings, real estate, hospitals, and other 
essential support industries make up the top 10 industries affected. Like the previous multi-
region analysis, the peripheral regions’ top affected industries do not share similarities. The 
spillover effect from the Urban model includes agricultural and energy-related industries in the 
rural counties top affected regions. The rural model’s spillover effect to urban counties includes 
similar industries as the primary region but some more specialized additions such as architectural 










Table 5.17. Top Ten Industries Affected in Primary Region of Counterfactual Rural Model 
 Description Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Owner-occupied dwellings 0 $0 $565,000 $871,000 
Real estate 3 $48,000 $304,000 $457,000 
Hospitals 2 $130,000 $145,000 $255,000 
Limited-service restaurants 2 $52,000 $129,000 $212,000 
Wholesale trade 1 $45,000 $82,000 $150,000 
Monetary authorities and 
depository credit intermediation 
1 $44,000 $84,000 $149,000 
Other financial investment 
activities 
1 $14,000 $17,000 $138,000 
Offices of physicians 1 $86,000 $83,000 $132,000 
Full-service restaurants 3 $64,000 $71,000 $131,000 
Electric power transmission and 
distribution 
0 $10,000 $40,000 $116,000 
 
Table 5.18. Top Ten Industries Affected in Periphery Region of Counterfactual Rural Model 
(Spillover to Urban) 
 Description Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Real estate 0 $7,000 $49,000 $71,000 
Management of companies and 
enterprises 
0 $26,000 $31,000 $49,000 
Other financial investment 
activities 
0 $10,000 $12,000 $46,000 
Wholesale trade 0 $15,000 $25,000 $39,000 
Nondepository credit 
intermediation and related 
activities 
0 $17,000 $18,000 $33,000 
Wired telecommunications carriers 0 $5,000 $13,000 $26,000 
Owner-occupied dwellings 0 $0 $15,000 $23,000 
Management consulting services 0 $13,000 $12,000 $20,000 
Architectural, engineering, and 
related services 
0 $10,000 $10,000 $18,000 
Data processing, hosting, and 
related services 








Table 5.19. Top Ten Industries Affected in Primary Region of Counterfactual Urban Model 
 Description Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Owner-occupied dwellings 0 $0 $6,001,000 $9,252,000 
Real estate 32 $581,000 $4,014,000 $5,885,000 
Wholesale trade 16 $1,405,000 $2,410,000 $3,671,000 
Hospitals 19 $1,462,000 $1,632,000 $2,894,000 
Insurance carriers 6 $624,000 $1,164,000 $2,457,000 
Limited-service restaurants 27 $546,000 $1,382,000 $2,387,000 
Other financial investment 
activities 
13 $493,000 $579,000 $2,270,000 
Offices of physicians 13 $1,411,000 $1,364,000 $1,989,000 
Full-service restaurants 29 $730,000 $810,000 $1,492,000 
Wired telecommunications 
carriers 
3 $301,000 $741,000 $1,456,000 
 
Table 5.20. Top Ten Industries Affected in Periphery Region of Counterfactual Urban 
Model (Spillover to Rural) 
Description Employment Labor Income Value Added Output 
Real estate 0 $6,000 $36,000 $54,000 
Beef cattle ranching and farming, 
including feedlots and dual-
purpose ranching and farming 
0 $6,000 $8,000 $40,000 
Electric power generation - Fossil  
fuel 
0 $3,000 $12,000 $33,000 
Electric power generation - Wind 0 $2,000 $23,000 $27,000 
Insurance agencies, brokerages, 
and related activities 
0 $6,000 $8,000 $22,000 
Animal, except poultry, 
slaughtering 
0 $2,000 $3,000 $22,000 
Wireless telecommunications 
carriers (except satellite) 
0 $0 $6,000 $20,000 
Extraction of natural gas and 
crude petroleum 
0 $8,000 $9,000 $19,000 
Electric power transmission and 
distribution 
0 $1,000 $5,000 $14,000 
Scenic and sightseeing 
transportation and support 
activities for transportation 
0 $8,000 $8,000 $14,000 
 
The counterfactual analysis explains the full story of how conservation easement monies 
affect rural and urban communities. With conservation easement payments, rural counties 
received $112.1 million in economic impact compared to our counterfactual impact of $5.8 
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million. Alternatively, urban counties received $53.8 million in economic impact from 
conservation easements and $79.1 million from decreased federal income tax (Table 5.21). Note 
that the total economic impact of conservation easements is greater than the counterfactual of 
lowering federal income tax. Decreased federal income tax is modeled as a direct injection to 
households – who save a portion of this money – whereas conservation easements are modeled 
as direct expenditures according to the results of the survey data.  
Table 5.21. Model Summary Results for Comparison 
Model and Region Employment Labor Income Total Value Added Output 
MRIO Impact on Rural 773 $35,198,000 $51,598,000 $112,087,000 
MRIO Impact on Urban 339 $20,047,000 $29,171,000 $53,838,000 
Counterfactual Impact 
on Rural 
45 $1,643,000 $3,205,000 $5,843,000 
Counterfactual Impact 
on Urban 
547 $25,990,000 $45,689,000 $79,135,000 
Single Region Impact 1,122 $56,356,000 $87,827,000 $176,061,000 
Aggregate MRIO 
Impact 
1,112 $55,245,000 $80,768,000 $165,924,000 
Aggregate 
Counterfactual Impact 
688 $31,859,000 $56,109,000 $97,850,000 
 
 I proposed two likely counterfactual scenarios: the zero counterfactual and a decrease in 
federal income tax. The zero counterfactual provides an upper bound on the best approximation 
for the impact of conservation easement payments: $112.1 million to rural counties and $53.8 
million to urban counties. The decrease in federal income tax provides the lower bound of the 
best approximation for the impact: $106.2 million to rural counties and a negative impact of 
$25.3 million in urban counties. These results show that conservation easement payments 
stimulate the economy more than decreasing federal income tax, and that conservation easement 
programs function as a transfer of wealth from urban to rural communities. ACEP, as part of the 




Willingness to Pay for Conservation Easements 
 The 18 identified studies provided a total of 56 values which were used in the meta-
analysis. The number of values provided from a single study range from 1 to 18 with an average 
of 3.11 studies. Studies published in peer-reviewed journals composed 11 out of these 18 studies. 
Household income, population, and area in square miles were not always available in the original 
study. In these cases, another source provided an estimate as outlined in Appendix C. Table 5.22 
provides summary information about the studies included in the meta-analysis. 
Table 5.22. WTP Studies Summary 
Author Number of Observations Year* Scale Published 
Beasley et al. (1986) 1 1986 city Y 
Bergstrom et al. (1985) 4 1981 county Y 
Bittner et al. (2006) 1 2001 county N 
Bowker & Didychuk (1994) 4 1994 city Y 
Cho et al. (2005) 1 2003 county Y 
Duke & Ilvento (2004b) 1 2001 state Y 
Duke et al. (2007) 18 2005 city N 
Fleischer & Tsur (2009) 2 2002 county Y 
Halstead (1984) 3 1984 city Y 
Johnston & Duke (2007a)  4 2005 city Y 
Johnston et al. (2001) 1 1995 county Y 
Kashian (2000) 1 1998 city N 
Krieger (1999) 1 1997 county N 
Mcleod et al. (2002) 1 1998 county N 
Ozdemir (2003) 4 2002 state N 
Ready et al. (1997) 4 1990 county Y 
Rosenberger & Walsh (1997) 4 1996 county Y 
Waddington (1990) 1 1990 county N 
*Note that the year column indicates the year the data were collected not the year of 
publication. 
 
 Previous testing shows that there is significant evidence that heteroskedasticity is present 
in the model. Even if the model suffers from heteroskedasticity, the coefficient estimates will 
remain consistent and estimating the WTP for agricultural land conservation in Colorado with 
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OLS results will not cause any problems. Heteroskedasticity in the model will make the 
estimates inefficient, so I report White’s heteroskedastic corrected standard errors as they will be 
correct with the presence of heteroskedasticity (Table 5.23). 


























Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
The coefficient estimates for Area, Popdensity, and Hhinc match the a priori 
expectations. The greater the area of land already conserved the less valuable another acre will 
be, so theory suggests the coefficient for Area should be negative. Higher population density 
suggests open space should be more valuable, so I expected the coefficient on Popdensity to be 
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positive. Finally, higher income households have higher WTP for agricultural land, so I expected 
the coefficient on Hhinc to be positive as well.  
 I used the OLS results to obtain an estimate for the WTP of agricultural land conservation 
in Colorado. The estimated 2018 WTP value for all conservation easements in Colorado at the 
state level is $0.000043 per acre per household per year. I am 95% confident that the true value 
is between $0.00001 and $0.00018. Converting these estimates to annual dollars per year, on 
average households would be willing to pay $102.09 annually for the current level of Colorado 
conserved lands with 95% confidence that the true value falls between $24.06 and $433.23 per 
household per year. The 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates states that 
there were 2,082,531 households in Colorado. Accordingly, I estimate that Coloradoans are 
willing to pay $212.6 million dollars annually for the current amount of conserved land or using 
a 5% discount rate $4.25 billion in a one-time payment. Table 5.24 shows a comparison of the 
Colorado estimate with other values found in the literature at the state level analysis. Although 
the estimated value is smaller than others, those estimates come from the East Coast. States like 
Delaware and Connecticut are socio-geographically different than Colorado. Given the level of 
conservation in Colorado and the smaller population density, the estimate is reasonable. 
Table 5.24. WTP Per Acre-Household Estimate Compared with Literature 
Author Year WTP Estimate State Published 
OLS Estimate 2018 0.00004 Colorado - 
Ozdemir (2003) 2002 0.00069 Maine N 
Ozdemir (2003) 2002 0.00096 Maine N 
Ozdemir (2003) 2002 0.00373 Maine N 
Johnston & Duke (2007a) 2005 0.00500 Connecticut Y 
Johnston & Duke (2007a) 2005 0.00600 Delaware Y 
Ozdemir (2003) 2002 0.00646 Maine N 




 The meta-analysis literature has studied best practices to address heteroskedasticity 
(Nelson & Kennedy, 2009). Since there is significant evidence that the data suffer from 
heteroskedasticity and the literature provides simple solutions, I ran a Weighted Least Squares 
regression using the sample size of the original study (Samplesize) as the weight (Table 5.25). 
As expected, none of the coefficient estimates changed significantly, but the standard errors 
changed. 
The WLS model should present more accurate standard errors which allow a more 
precise discussion of the importance of variables. Area, sample size, household income, and 
publication status are all highly significant. Economic theory suggests that area and household 
income should be important factors in determining WTP. The meta-analysis literature also 
discusses the importance of sample size and publication status (Woodward & Wui, 2001; 
Brander et al., 2006; Nelson & Kennedy, 2009; Ghermandi et al., 2010). Population density, 
year, and scale of study are not significantly different from zero. Although preferences for 
agricultural land conservation may change over the years, the results support Magnan et al. 
(2012) who found robust willingness to pay for agricultural land over time. Surprisingly 
population density is not statistically significant; however, population density may be 
confounded with the scale of the study. Overall the results match the a priori expectations based 


































Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 The results show that a one percent increase in the area of land already conserved 
decreases the annual WTP per household per acre by 1.056 percent (or a decrease of $2 million 
in perpetuity in the case of the entire state of Colorado). In contrast, a one percent increase in the 
median household income increases annual WTP per household per acre by 2.67 percent (or an 
increase of $5 million in perpetuity in the case of Colorado). Interestingly, county-level estimates 
are statistically higher than state and city level estimates at the 0.1 threshold. City and state 





 Across the diverse ecosystems of Colorado, conservation easements on private lands 
account for 2.4 million acres. An average acre of conserved land in Colorado contains 37% 
grassland, 25% forest, and 23% shrubland. Colorado’s diverse natural landscape cause variations 
in this average depending on geographic region. For example, a conserved acre in Southeast 
Colorado, which includes Baca, Bent, Crowley, Huerfano, Kiowa, Las Animas, Otero, Pueblo, 
and Prowers counties, contains an average of 56% grassland, 23% forest, and 15% shrubland. 
I used a benefit transfer approach to estimate the total value of the ecosystem services on 
private lands protected by conservation easements to Coloradoans. Considering an average acre 
of conserved land in Colorado, annual ecosystem service benefits per acre range from $849 
(using minimum values) and $995 (using maximum values) per acre per year and in the range of 
$2-2.3 billion in total value per year (2018 dollars). Table 5.26 shows the annual estimated 
benefits provided in Colorado by land cover type. 
Table 5.26. Total Annual Benefits Provided by Land Cover Type, 2018$ 
Land Cover State Min  State Max  
Open Water 3,080,000 4,788,000 
Forest 1,195,595,000 1,343,443,000 
Scrub/Shrub 260,095,000 353,427,000 
Grassland 415,631,000 434,322,000 
Agriculture 53,485,000 57,858,000 
Woody Wetlands 61,083,000 111,312,000 
Herbaceous Wetlands 36,158,000 67,772,000 
Total 2,025,129,000 2,372,923,000 
Average Per Acre 849 995 
 
Note that the estimated average values per acre are annual values. However, conservation 
easements protect lands and provide ecosystem benefits for longer than one year. To better 
estimate the ecosystem benefits that accrue from the conservation of lands I estimated the 
benefits over the life of the conservation easement. Over the lifetime of the easements, 
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Coloradoans receive between $40 and $47 billion and an average conserved acre provides 
between $17,000 and $19,900 of benefits (Table 5.27).  
Table 5.27. Cost and Benefits of Conservation Easements in Perpetuity, r = 0.05, 2018$  
Min for CO Max for CO 
Total Benefits 40,502,578,000 47,458,455,000 
Average Benefits Per Acre 17,000 19,900 
Average Easement Compensation Per Acre 899 
Average Easement Appraisal Value Per Acre 1,151 
 
These ranges of public benefit values should provide the theoretical upper bound on what 
the public would be willing to pay annually to receive these benefits. If this were the annual 
public rental rate in exchange for these ecosystem service benefits, then the public purchase price 
for such a parcel would be $17,000 - $19,900 per acre, in addition to its remaining value in 
production agriculture, using a 5% discount rate (Table 5.27). 
The benefits generated from conservation do not come without a cost, however. Since 
conservation easement programs wish to minimize taxpayer burden, I also report state-funded 
compensation paid to landowners, which excludes tax credit programs, as a lower bound of the 
cost to Colorado taxpayers. However, conservation easement programs require voluntary 
participation of landowners, so I also report appraisal value, which serves as an estimate of the 
opportunity cost of participation to landowners. Using actual conservation easement transaction 
data from the Colorado land trust community, I found an average state-funded payment of $899 
per acre conserved or about 78% of the appraised value. Additional compensation comes in the 
form of participation in tax credit programs for the value of the donated portion of the easement 
up to the total appraised value of the easement.  
I used state-funded conservation easement payments as the lower bound cost to taxpayers 
and appraisal value as the upper bound. Private land conservation, which costs on average 
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between $899 (without tax credits) and $1,151 (with maximum tax credits, federal match, etc) 
per acre to conserve through an easement purchase, generates between $17,000 and $19,900 per 
acre in public ecosystem service benefits. This translates into an average return on investment of 
$13 – $21 in the form of public ecosystem services for every $1 invested in conservation 
easements in the state of Colorado.  
ACEP Payment 
 I applied the rental rate for the corresponding category and year to the aggregated dataset 
of conservation easements, and I obtained the annual rental value of the sample of conservation 
easements. Since the total value of the land is of interest, I assumed the rental value is in 
perpetuity using a 5% interest rate. I calculated the total rental value of the land and report the 
results in Table 5.28. Although irrigated cropland is only one-quarter of the acreage of pastures, 
the higher rental rate results in the highest contribution of $34.3 million to the total rental value 
in perpetuity of $44.4 million.  
Table 5.28. Rental Value of Conservation Easement Lands 
Category Annual Rental Value Total Value in Perpetuity, r=0.05 
Irrigated Cropland $1,717,158 $34,343,160 
Non-irrigated Cropland $21,448 $428,964 
Pasture $482,635 $9,652,706 
Total $2,221,241 $44,424,820 
 
 I estimated the proposed compensation as three-quarters of the rental value of the land 
multiplied by the proportion of the opportunity cost to the rental value of the sample plus a tenth 
of the estimated minimum environmental benefits provided. I used the following equation in the 
calculations: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 = 0.75 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 ∗ (𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 ) + 0.1 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 
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The rental value of the sample is $44.4 million as seen in Table 5.36. The federal and nonfederal 
amount of conservation easement compensation to landowners totaled to $113 million for the 
sample. This gives a proportion of opportunity cost to rental values of 2.55. This means that for 
every dollar of rental value there is an estimated $2.55 of opportunity cost in the form of 
development. Using this proposed compensation equation, the total proposed payments for the 
conservation easement sample is $169.5 million dollars compared to the current $113.3 million 
dollars spent.  
 I performed a sensitivity analysis because the existing literature does not suggest how 
opportunity cost and environmental benefits should be weighted. I report the proposed 
compensation for the sample in Colorado after I changed one coefficient by +/- 0.05 while 
keeping the other coefficient constant. I included the values of increasing and decreasing both 
coefficients by 0.05 as well. Lastly, I report the coefficients values that achieved the estimated 
WTP for the sample keeping the other coefficient value constant. Table 5.29 shows the results of 
this analysis. Since estimated benefits are much larger than estimated opportunity cost, a 0.05 
change in the benefit coefficient caused a much larger change in the proposed compensation. 
Note that all proposed compensation results exceed the current payment amount and most remain 
under the estimated WTP. This analysis shows that the proposed coefficient values illustrate an 
alternative payment mechanism that balances both opportunity cost and benefits while remaining 















Change Relative to Proposed 
Coefficient Values (%) 
Comparison to 
WTP Estimate 
0.75 0.1 $169,459,000 0.00 Under 
0.8 0.1 $175,123,000 3.34 Under 
0.7 0.1 $163,794,000 -3.34 Under 
0.75 0.05 $127,211,000 -24.93 Under 
0.75 0.15 $211,707,000 24.93 Over 
0.7 0.05 $121,546,000 -28.27 Under 
0.8 0.15 $206,043,000 21.59 Over 
0.75 0.11 $180,497,000 6.51 Equal 
0.85 0.1 $180,497,000 6.51 Equal 
 
 Due to data constraints, first I compare payment schemes for a smaller subset of 
conservation easements in Southeast Colorado defined as the following counties: Baca, Bent, 
Crowley, Huerfano, Kiowa, Las Animas, Otero, Pueblo, and Prowers. Proposed GARC values 
for Southeast Colorado are shown in Table 5.30. I present the proposed GARC values, estimated 
benefits, actual conservation easement compensation, estimated productive value, and proposed 
compensation of the subset of 20 conservation easements in Southeast Colorado (Table 5.31).  
Table 5.30. Proposed GARC Payments for Southeast Colorado 
Land Use GARC Payment per Acre 
Irrigated Crop $1,918 
Non-irrigated Crop $400 
Grassland $394 
Non-Ag Bottomland $833 
 
Table 5.31. Comparison of Conservation Easement Values for Southeast Subset 
Method Value 
GARC $6,317,700 
Minimum Benefits with Carbon $20,583,200 
Maximum Benefits with Carbon $22,100,800 
Actual Compensation $5,431,500 
Rental Value $6,907,400 




The proposed GARC value closely matches both actual compensation and the rental value of the 
land in Southeast Colorado. Since development potential in Southeast Colorado is not as close to 
the average development potential in Colorado as a whole, the proposed compensation overstates 
the value of conservation easements in Southeast Colorado.  
 I considered an illustrative example of 100 acres of grassland in Otero County in 
Southeastern Colorado. The estimated ecosystem service benefits would be between $916,000 
and $958,000 in perpetuity. Coloradoans’ willingness to pay for a conservation easement on the 
parcel is $166,600 in perpetuity. The rental value would be $5,400 and the GARC payment value 
would be $39,400. The proposed payment value would be $105,000 (Table 5.32). As noted 
previously, the values change drastically with a specific parcel and scaling values such as 
willingness to pay to a specific parcel can produce inaccurate values. These estimations can 
provide insight into larger scales, but with highly heterogenous land these values might not be 
applicable to a given parcel. 
Table 5.32. Values for Hypothetical Grassland in Otero County, r=0.05, 2018$ 
Minimum Benefits with Carbon $916,000 
Maximum Benefits with Carbon $958,000 
Willingness to Pay $166,600 
Rental Value $5,400 
GARC Value $39,400 
Proposed Compensation $105,000 
 
 I scaled the analysis to the entire sample of conservation easements and compare 
estimated benefits, actual compensation, productive value, and proposed compensation (Table 
5.33). As I aggregate, the actual compensation diverges from productive value. This reflects the 
fact that conservation easement payments are based on development potential, and land with 
lower rental values might have more development potential in more urban areas. Estimated 
benefits still far exceed actual or proposed compensation. The proposed compensation 
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compensates landowners more than actual compensation, but this reflects the large difference 
between payments and benefits. Since benefits are taken into consideration the proposed 
compensation exceeds the current compensation method. While this might be worrisome for 
taxpayers, this gives landowners incentive to enroll land that provides more environmental 
benefits rather than land with high development potential. I calculated the estimated WTP for the 
conservation easement sample and convert it from annual to perpetuity using a 5% discount rate. 
While the proposed compensation does increase the total cost of the sample of conservation 
easements in Colorado, it does capture more of the public’s willingness to pay for those 
conserved lands without exceeding it. 
Table 5.33. Comparison of Conservation Easement Value for Entire Sample 
Method Value 
Minimum Benefits with Carbon $844,961,700 
Maximum Benefits with Carbon $892,570,200 
Actual Compensation $113,282,500 
Rental Value $44,424,800 
Proposed Compensation $169,458,600 









The economic consequences of conservation easements appear to justify the costs and 
risks. However, the analysis could be improved upon in future research. I outline the limitations 
of the economic impact analysis, benefit transfer values, and alternative payment mechanisms. 
Economic Impact 
Economic Impact Analysis can only be applied to the federal contribution to conservation 
easement payments. State matching programs in the available data for Colorado account for 
$69.8 million in conservation easement payments; however, this money serves as a transfer to 
conservation easement holders from the state government, and therefore primarily Colorado 
resident taxpayers. As such no new economic activity can be determined in our economic impact 
analysis at the state level as it is a transfer within the state. These transfers may have real impacts 
on individuals and potentially even specific counties or communities. Since the source of state 
match monies cannot be identified, I cannot say with certainty what this redistribution might 
look like.  
The survey failed to specify where expenditures occurred. Although this would impose a 
large burden on the surveyed landowners, more granular detail of the exact expenditures, as well 
as the location, would increase the accuracy of the multi-regional economic impact analysis on 
rural vs urban Coloradoans. Future surveys could collect data to address some of these 
uncertainties in the model. 
The analysis does not evaluate the potentially significant investment effects that may 
come from conservation easement payments. The Input-Output model treats the conservation 
easement payments as a one-time influx of dollars into the Colorado economy, which under-
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estimates the positive economic outcomes stemming from the conservation easement payment.  
For example, if the easement payment is used to invest in better technology, that improved 
technology may have lasting positive effects on the economy that are not captured in the 
analysis. The analysis cannot capture other non-expenditure effects that were reported such as 
increased elk grazing, building rental homes, increased outdoor recreation, and supplementing 
income through rough years. As a result, the economic impact results are a conservative estimate 
of the economic activity generated over 2009 to 2017 from federal agricultural conservation 
easement payments in Colorado. 
The IMPLAN software does not allow for aggregation of sectors in a Multi-Region 
Input-Output model. Future work could construct an MRIO model outside of the software in 
order to aggregate the sectors and more accurately reflect the survey responses.  
Benefit Transfer 
 Benefit transfer methods can provide accurate results if used appropriately. Although 
values from the literature were screened, some values applied to land types in Colorado may not 
be entirely appropriate. Values from Eastern United States may not be applicable to Colorado. 
Future research could collect primary data on the ecosystem services provided by conservation 
easements in Colorado and estimate the value of those services. Alternatively, with a growing 
database of primary ecosystem service valuation studies, a meta-analysis could be conducted to 
estimate ecosystem service values for Colorado in particular which would improve upon a 
simple benefit transfer method. 
The results show that the per acre benefits make it clear that the payments received are 
considerably lower than the lifetime ecosystem benefits generated from the easement and are 
similar to the average annual ecosystem benefits stemming from land conservation. This does not 
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account for alternative use of the land. That is, land development provides some amount of 
ecosystem service values which were not accounted for in this analysis and as such the values are 
over estimated. Future research could account for the benefits provided by an alternative land use 
by surveying landowners to determine the most probable alternative use of the land in the 
absence of the conservation easement. 
Alternative Payment Mechanisms 
The heterogeneity of agricultural land in Colorado makes a simple conservation easement 
payment mechanism impossible. The results of this thesis show that the opportunity cost of 
agricultural land in Southeast Colorado differs from all of Colorado, so any payment mechanism 
based on the opportunity cost of the land will vary drastically across counties. If the program 
shifts focus and tries to maximize ecological benefits, then a payment mechanism based on 
ecosystem services could be applied across county lines. However, given the limitations of this 
benefit transfer study, a better methodology would be warranted to estimate the ecosystem 
service values. All payment mechanisms would incur tradeoffs between costs and benefits. The 
results of this thesis show that Coloradoans are willing to pay for conservation easements and the 
estimated benefits are worth the costs. As such, future research could investigate alternative 
payment mechanisms in greater depth.  
Additional research could explore different aspects of the program aside from the 
payment mechanisms. For example, incentivizing landowners to apply earlier in the year could 
reduce demand of the state approved appraisers. Similarly, changing liability legislation could 
entice more appraisers to become state certified. I do not consider any of these aspects of the 
program in my analysis, but additional research in these areas could provide further insight into 
these issues.   
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 To have a better grasp of the economic implications of the Agricultural Conservation 
Easement Program in Colorado, I have explored a wide range of metrics in the analysis. 
Conservation easements have been a source of contention in Colorado after early cases of 
misuse. This has led the Colorado government to pursue more oversight and implementing more 
cautionary measures. This, in turn, led to a surplus of state budget earmarked for conservation 
easements. While caution is warranted, I explored some of the economic implications of 
conservation easements to understand the costs and benefits of ACEP in Colorado. I explored the 
economic impact to the state and then disaggregated the impacts between rural and urban areas 
in Colorado. I then compared this with a counterfactual to understand what an alternative use of 
those federal dollars might look like. I investigated the willingness to pay for agricultural land 
literature and estimated how much Coloradoans are willing to pay for conservation easements. I 
quantified some of the ecosystem service benefits of conservation easements through a benefit 
transfer methodology. Lastly, I compared all of the results to understand how the current costs 
compare to benefits and Coloradoans’ willingness to pay. I proposed an alternative payment 
system that compensates landowners directly for environmental benefits and captures more of 
the publics’ willingness to pay for those benefits.  
 The single area Input-Output analysis showed that conservation easement payments in 
Colorado generated $176 million in economic activity. I improve upon this initial analysis by 
conducting a Multi-Region Input-Output analysis with rural and urban counties. This analysis 
showed that of the total estimated impact in the MRIO analysis of $166 million, $112 million of 
the economic activity occurred in rural counties, while $54 million occurred in urban counties. I 
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further improved upon this analysis by conducting a counterfactual analysis. I considered two 
counterfactual scenarios. The first assumed that the federal dollars used to fund ACEP would be 
used by another government program with a negligible economic impact on Colorado. The 
second assumed that Coloradoans received a decrease in federal income tax because of voluntary 
nonparticipation in ACEP. These counterfactuals serve as bounds for the best approximation of 
the economic impact of ACEP in Colorado. The second counterfactual analysis effectively 
injected federal dollars to households and examines the increased economic activity. Of the total 
$85 million of increased economic activity in the second counterfactual, only $6 million 
occurred in rural counties while $79 million occurred in urban counties. First, note that 
conservation easement payments generated $81 million more in economic activity than the 
counterfactual federal income tax decrease. Further, the distribution of the impact shows that 
rural communities received $106 million more in economic impact through conservation 
easement payments than the counterfactual. Urban communities received $25 million less in 
economic impact through conservation easement payments than the counterfactual. I estimate the 
best approximation for the economic impact of conservation easements on rural counties to be 
between $106 million and $112 million. One objective of the Farm Bill throughout the years has 
been to support rural communities. The results show that in Colorado conservation easements 
have been an effective way of achieving that goal. 
 Conservation easement payments support rural communities; however, a comparison 
must be made with the costs. The greatest burden lies with taxpayers and if they are not willing 
to pay the costs then the government might be misrepresenting the people. I examined the 
willingness to pay literature and estimated how much Coloradoans are willing to pay for the 
current amount of conserved lands. I searched the literature and constructed a meta-analysis 
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regression to find that Coloradoans are willing to pay $0.00004 per acre per household per year. I 
determined that this is a reasonable estimate compared to other values in the literature 
considering the differences between Colorado and the East Coast. For the sample of conservation 
easement data, this results in a total willingness to pay of $180 million compared to the actual 
payments of $113 million. This shows that Coloradoans are willing to pay more than the current 
amount of compensation to conservation easement holders.  
 Coloradoans are willing to pay the current cost of conservation easements, but what 
benefits do they receive from this land conservation? I used a benefit transfer methodology to 
estimate the ecosystem service values from conservation easements. I found a range of values in 
the literature which would apply to ecosystem services in Colorado. For the sample of 
conservation easement data, I estimated that public ecosystem benefits range from $845 million 
to $893 million. The estimated ecosystem benefits are more than 7 times the amount of actual 
payments and over 4 times what Coloradoans would be willing to pay. This shows that 
conservation easements provide a considerable amount of non-consumptive use benefits to the 
state of Colorado. 
 The proposed alternate payment method compensates landowners for the real loss in 
value due to forgone development rights but also encourages enrollment of lands that provide 
more ecological benefits. One can easily find rental rates for the county of the potential easement 
and calculate the estimated value of the foregone development rights. I multiplied this by three 
quarters and added one-tenth of the estimated minimum ecosystem service values of the potential 
easement. This not only creates incentives to enroll ecologically valuable land but allows 
compensation estimates based on the type of land and county location. For the sample of 
conservation easements, the proposed methodology would have paid conservation easement 
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holders $169 million. This is more than the $113 million under the current method but is still 
lower Coloradoans’ willingness to pay of $180 million. This proposed method allows 
landowners to capture more of the willingness to pay for the public benefits that they provide 
through conservation easements. 
 The proposed method does not solve every issue with current conservation easement 
payments. It does not capture enough heterogeneity across regions as seen in the results for a 
subsample of conservation easements in Southeast Colorado. State actors will still require 
individual appraisals to account for this heterogeneity. However, this imposes real barriers to 
entry for landowners considering enrolling their land in a conservation easement. As the results 
show, Colorado and its citizens would benefit from using all $45 million annual of the state 
budget to increase the number of conservation easements. A federally approved alternative 
payment mechanism that could estimate the value of the conservation easement without an 
individual appraisal could increase the number of conservation easements. This alternative 
method would increase enrollment of smaller parcels of land which previously would not enroll 
due to initial appraisal costs.  
 The Agricultural Conservation Easement Program succeeds in supporting rural counties 
in Colorado and providing many ecosystem services to the residents of Colorado. The analysis 
shows that these benefits and outcomes are greater than both the cost of the program as well as 
Coloradoans’ stated willingness to pay for the program. Although there are reasons to continue 
requiring individual appraisals to value potential land for enrollment in the program, I show that 
alternative methods can remove barriers to entry for landowners, encourage enrollment of more 
environmentally valuable land, remain within Coloradoans’ willingness to pay, and potentially 
increase the overall acreage of conserved lands. The proposed method comes with challenges, 
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but the analysis showed that conservation easements are worthwhile investments for Colorado. 
Colorado should dedicate more resources for developing an alternative methodology to lessen 
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Dear [insert name], 
The Colorado Land Trust Community is partnering with researchers at Colorado State University’s 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics (DARE) to better understand the economic 
impact of federal conservation easement programs on Colorado communities. Participants include 
all Colorado landowners who received payments from these federal programs since 2007. The 
results of this research will be used to help inform funding decisions for these types of producer 
programs in the future. 
We at [insert organization] request that you complete and return the enclosed survey within the 
next two weeks. Participation will take approximately 10-15 minutes. Your participation in this 
research is voluntary. If you decide to participate in the study, you may withdraw your consent 
and stop participation at any time without penalty.  
This survey is designed to help researchers estimate the economic impact of these programs on 
Colorado communities. We will keep your identity strictly confidential and all data analysis and 
reporting protocols will be followed closely. When we report and share the data with others, we 
will combine the data from all participants.  
While there is no known direct benefit to you, we hope to gain important insights that will help 
inform funding decisions for conservation programs in the future. It is not possible to identify all 
potential risk in research procedures, but the researchers have taken reasonable safeguards to 
minimize any known and potential (but unknown) risks. Completing the survey and returning it in 
the enclosed stamped envelope is your consent to participate. 
If you have any questions about the research, please contact Professor Andy Seidl at 
Andrew.Seidl@colostate.edu or Research Scientist Rebecca Hill at rebec.hill@colostate.edu and 
refer to Federal Conservation Easement Payment Recipient Survey in the subject line of your 
message. If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, please contact 
the CSU IRB at: RICRO_IRB@mail.colostate.edu; 970-491-1553. 




Federal Conservation Easement Payment Recipient Survey 
 
 
The Colorado Land Trust Community4 is partnering with researchers at Colorado State 
University’s Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics (DARE) to better understand 
the economic impact of federal conservation easement programs5 on Colorado communities. 
Participants include all Colorado landowners who received payments from these federal programs 
since 2007. The results of this research will be used to help inform funding decisions for these 
types of producer programs in the future.  
 
In [insert date of easement closing] you received payments in the amount of [insert $$ number] 
for conveying a conservation easement to [insert organization]. This survey is designed to help 
researchers estimate the economic impact of these programs on Colorado communities. For the 
easement payment described above, please respond to each question fully and to the best of your 
ability. If you have entered into more than one easement agreement on your operation since 2007, 
you will need to complete the survey for EACH easement agreement separately. Participation will 
take approximately 10-15 minutes.  
 
Your participation in this survey is voluntary and strictly confidential. If you decide to participate 
in this survey, you may withdraw your consent and stop participation at any time without penalty. 
We will keep your identity strictly confidential and all data analysis and reporting protocols will 
be followed closely. When we report and share the data with others, we will combine the data from 
all participants. While there is no known direct benefit to you, we hope to gain important insights 
that will help inform funding decisions for conservation programs in the future. It is not possible 
to identify all potential risk in research procedures, but the researchers have taken reasonable 
safeguards to minimize any known and potential (but unknown) risks. To indicate your consent to 
participate in this research please select “Yes” below and continue with the survey. If you do not 




                                               
4
 The Colorado Cattlemen’s Land Trust (CCLT), Colorado Open Lands (COL), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Mesa Land 
Trust (Mesa), Rio Grande Headwaters Land Trust (RiGHT), the Gunnison Ranchland Conservancy Legacy (GRCL), 
Yampa Valley Land Trust (YVLT), Aspen Valley Land Trust (AVLT), San Isabel Land Protection Trust (SILTP), Palmer 
Land Trust (Palmer), and Headwaters Conservancy. 
5
 Farm and Ranch Land Protection Program (FRPP), Grassland Reserve Program (GRP), Agricultural Conservation 
Easement Program (ACEP), Agricultural Land Easements (ALE). 
 
113 
1. As a result of this easement have you added hunting/fishing or other outdoor recreation activities 
to your operation? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
2. If you answered “Yes” to question 1: 
 
a) What were the estimated gross revenues from these activities: $__________/yr. 
 
b) What are the estimated number of visitor-days from these activities: _________/yr. 
 
c) If you added employees, please indicate the number of full time equivalent employees hired 
to support these activities: _________FTE.  
 
 
3. In completing the table below, please round to the nearest acre: 
 
Immediately Before Entering 
into Easement 
Directly Following Entrance 
into Easement (1 - 3 years 
post easement) 
Total Farmed (Ranched) 
Acres 
acres acres 
Acres Irrigated with Flood 
Irrigation 
acres acres 
Acres Irrigated through 
Mechanized Means (roller, 






4. How many acres are in production of the following (Please round to the nearest acre): 
 
 
Immediately Before Entering 
into Easement 
Directly Following Entrance 
into Easement (1 - 3 years 
post easement) 
Livestock Grazing acres acres 
Fallow acres acres 
Fruit Production  acres acres 
Row Crop Production (e.g., 
corn, wheat, alfalfa, sugar 
beets) 
acres acres 
Idle acres acres 
Other  acres acres 
 






5. For the operation on which this easement is placed I: 
o Am the primary operator 
o Am a co-operator 
o Lease out the land 
 
6. Have you noticed any change in your yields or stocking rates as a result of adopting the 
conservation practices required by the easement? 
o Yes  




7. If you answered “Yes” to question 6, please indicate by what percentage your yield or stocking 
rates changed due to conservation easement practices: 
 
Baseline yield 
or stocking rate 
per acre 
Estimated yield or stocking rate change due to 
easement practices (% change) 
(please circle one) 
Livestock Grazing  /acre 
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 (no change) +10 +20 +30 +40 
+50  
Fruit Production  /acre 
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 (no change) +10 +20 +30 +40 
+50 
Row Crop Production 
(e.g., corn, wheat, 
alfalfa, sugar beets)  
/acre 
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 (no change) +10 +20 +30 +40 
+50 
Other  /acre 
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 (no change) +10 +20 +30 +40 
+50 
 















9. If you changed your farming/ranching operation due to this easement, please use the space below 










10. In the list below please indicate what proportion of your total conservation payment went to 
each of the following (they should sum to 100%): 
Invested back into the ag operation through 
purchases of inputs (including restocking 
livestock herds), labor, equipment or other 
infrastructure (including irrigation 
infrastructure)  % 
Invested in non-farm land-based enterprise 
diversification (e.g., agritourism, 
hunting/fishing, outdoor recreation) ___________% 
Invested in the purchase or lease of additional 
land to expand the ag operation % 
Invested in savings (could include retirement 
fund or stock market investment as well as 
savings accounts) ___________% 
Invested in post-high-school education of a 
family member  ___________% 
Pay down farm debt  
% 
Purchase of non-business related goods (e.g., 







If Other, please describe: _______________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Please use the space provided below to provide 





We anticipate the results of this survey will be available in May 2018. If you would like a copy of 
the results, to hear from us when the results will be presented in your community, have questions, 
comments or other feedback, please contact: Professor Andrew Seidl 
(Andrew.Seidl@colostate.edu) at your Colorado State University 
 




Appendix B: Methodology for Filling in Missing Meta-Analysis Data 
 In some cases, I was not able to obtain all the necessary data from the study itself. In 
these cases, I consulted additional outside data sources. The most common of these sources was 
the US Census and the USDA Census of Agriculture. Table B.1 lists the data sources consulted 
for each study. Most frequently I consulted outside sources to find the population, area, or 
household income for a study area. For Ready et al. (1997), I used Nutt et al. (2011) to find the 
average acreage of a horse farm in Kentucky. I was then able to include Ready et al. (1997) by 
converting the proposed number of horse farms conserved into acres. Bittner et al. (2006) do not 
report the number of acres of agricultural land in Moffat County, Colorado, so I used the USDA 
Census of Agriculture to provide an estimate of the existing acreage of agricultural land. For the 
study conducted by Cho et al. (2005), I assumed that the 1100 acres cited in the study was the 














Table B.1. Data Sources for Missing Willingness to Pay Data 
Study Data Source Data Type 
Beasley et al. (1986) US Census Population, Household Income, Area 
Bergstrom et al. (1985) US Census Population, Household Income 
Bittner et al. (2006) 
USDA Census of 
Agriculture 
Population, Area, Area of Agricultural 
Land 
Bowker & Didychuk (1994) Statistics Canada Population, Area 
Cho et al. (2005) US Census Population, Number of Households 
Duke & Ilvento (2004b) US Census Population, Area 
Duke et al. (2007) US Census 
Population, Household Income, Area, 
Average Household Size 
Halstead (1984) US Census Population 
Johnston & Duke (2007a) US Census Population 
Kashian (2000) US Census Population 
Krieger (1999) US Census Population, Area 
Mcleod et al. (2002) US Census Population, Area 
Mcleod et al. (2002) 
USDA Census of 
Agriculture 
Area of Agricultural Land 
Ozdemir (2003) US Census Population, Area, Average Household Size 
Ready et al. (1997) Nutt et al. (2011) Average Area of Horse Farms 
Ready et al. (1997) US Census Population, Household Income 
Rosenberger & Walsh 
(1997) 
US Census Population, Household Income 
Waddington (1990) US Census Population, Area, Average Household Size 
Waddington (1990) 
USDA Census of 
Agriculture 
Area of Agricultural Land   
 
Appendix C: Conservation Easement Parcels 
While there are a variety of conserved lands, I only examined conservation easement 
parcels. Using COMaP, I filtered PROTECTION_MECHANISM to include any values 
containing “CE” in order to select conservation easements. I also filtered OWNER to include 
only Land Trust, Private, and NGO in order to exclude publicly owned conservation easements. 
When referring to all conservation easements in Colorado, I am referring to these parcels. 
Only permanent conservation easements are eligible for federal programs. However, term 
(say, 20 or 30 yrs.) conservation easements do exist in COMaP. In the sort of the available data, I 
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assumed that easements are in effect in 2018, unless I have information confirming the parcel 
does not remain protected. A total of roughly 2.4 million acres included in the analysis (Figure 
C.1).  
 
Figure C.1. Locations of Conservation Easements Included in Analysis of Entire State 
 
The ecosystem service values from the literature separated into benefit transfer categories 
differ slightly from NLCD land cover types. Table C.1 shows how benefit transfer values apply 






Table C.1. Land Cover Crosswalk 
Benefit Transfer Category NLCD 
Open Water Open Water 
Not Evaluated Perennial Ice/Snow 
Not Evaluated Developed, Open Space 
Not Evaluated Developed, low  
Not Evaluated Developed, medium 
Not Evaluated Developed, High 
Not Evaluated Barren 
Forest Deciduous Forest 
Forest Evergreen Forest 





Woody Wetlands Woody Wetlands 
Emergent Herbaceous Wetlands Emergent Herbaceous Wetlands 
 
The data for the subset of conservation easements in South East Colorado specified the 
general ecosystem conserved and I mapped them into NLCD categories. Acreage assigned to 
multiple ecosystems were divided evenly among those ecosystems. For example, an easement 
















ACEP – Agricultural Conservation Easement Program 
ALE – Agricultural Land Easement 
AWMA – Area Wide Market Analysis 
CoMAP – Colorado Ownership, Management and Protection 
CRP – Conservation Reserve Program 
CVM – Contingent Valuation Method 
ERS – Economic Research Service 
EVRI – Environmental Valuation Reference Inventory 
FRPP – Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program 
GARC – Geographic Area Rate Cap 
GRP – Grassland Reserve Program 
IMPLAN – Economic Impact Analysis for Planning 
InVEST – Integrated Valuation of Ecosystem Services and Tradeoffs 
IRS – Internal Revenue Service 
MRIO – Multi-Region Input-Output 
NLCD – National Land Cover Database 
NRCS – National Resource Conservation Service 
OLS – Ordinary Least Squares 
RUCC – Rural-Urban Continuum Code 
TEEB – The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
WLS – Weighted Least Squares 
WRE – Wetland Reserve Easement 
WRP – Wetland Reserve Program 
WTP – Willingness to Pay 
 
 
